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I. INTRODUCTION
With the exception of independence for the Philippines, the
United States has assumed integration- Statehood- as the
ultimate goal for its territories. The Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, however, has received legal recognition as a distinct status
relationship, different from that of either a State or territory, in
the United States. This relationship was the precedent relied
upon in the case of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas
and by the Associated States established within the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands. It is also the precedent to which
Guam, the Virgin Islands and, to a lesser degree, American Samoa
are looking in evaluating the potential benefit of various status
alternatives. The significance of the Commonwealth and its poten-
tial in the United States federal system is critical as the debate in-
tensifies between Statehood and Commonwealth partisans in
Puerto Rico. This article describes the boundaries and the poten-
tial of the Commonwealth as well as the challenges it creates for
the United States federal structure. It also delineates the issues
involved in the status choices now before the United States and
Puerto Rico: Statehood versus Commonwealth.
II. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES-PUERTO RICO RELATIONS
Puerto Rico's modern history began in 1508 when the Spanish
established a small outpost at Caparra across the bay from
modern San Juan.' The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is com-
*Special Counsel, United States Senate Sub-Committee on Immigration; A.B. Columbia
College (1951); LL.B. Yale Law School (1954); University of Heidelberg (1956-1957). The
author was General Counsel to the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status
of Puerto Rico (1964-1966). The views expressed herein are those of the author.
Columbus stopped briefly in Puerto Rico in 1508 and named the island San Juan
Bautista. See generally A. MORALES CARRION, HISTORIA DEL PUEBLO DE PUERTO RIco:
DESDE' SUS ORIGENES HASTA EL SIGLIO (1968).
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posed of four small islands (Puerto Rico, Vieques, Culebra, and
Mona) located in the Caribbean, about 1,100 miles southeast of
Florida. The largest, Puerto Rico, is 100 miles long (east to west)
and thirty-five miles wide (north to south).
Puerto Rico is one of the most densely populated areas in the
United States, containing more than three million people, most of
whom speak Spanish as their native tongue. Not surprisingly, a
strong sense of cultural unity exists. The significance to be given
the Puerto Rican sense of cultural distinctiveness has been a ma-
jor issue affecting local Puerto Rican politics and status relations
with the United States.
A. The Cultural Issue
As with virtually all of North and South America, Puerto Rico
is the product of the confluence of three societies: Indians,
African blacks, and European whites.
1. The Taino Indian Heritage
At the time of the Spanish settlements, Puerto Rico was in-
habited by Taino Indians, an Arawack people that moved north-
ward along the chain of West Indian Isles to Puerto Rico from the
South American continent. Estimates of their original number
vary widely, from as low as 30,000 to as many as 600,000.
However, conquest in battle, intermarriage, and enslavement
precipitated the rapid dilution of the distinctive Indian race.3
Puerto Rican cultural historians have identified vestiges of the
Taino culture in various aspects of Puerto Rican life (place names,
architectural forms, food and music)4 and all status partisans in
Puerto Rico pay obeisance to their historical presence.5 However,
the tradition is spent as a cultural force important to the evolution
of Puerto Rican institutions or to Puerto Rico's relationships with
the States and its Caribbean neighbors.
2 M. SAGRERA, RACISMO Y POLITICS EN PUERTO Rico: LA DESINTEGRACION INTERNA Y EX-
TERNA DE UN PUEBLO 9 (1973). See also J. FEWKES, THE ABORIGENES OF PUERTO RICO AND
NEIGHBORING ISLANDS (1970).
1 M. BALLESTEROS & L. GOMEZ ACEVEDO, INDIGENOUS CULTURES OF PUERTO RICO 175
(1975).
Id. passim. For a discussion of the opening of the Institute of Culture's new Indian
museum, see P. BLOCH, PAINTING AND SCULPTURE OF THE PUERTO RICANS 15-30 (1978); San
Juan Star, Aug. 5, 1978, at 2, col. 1.
' "Puerto Rico's culture ... is changing .... It owes much to Spain, Africa, and the Taino
Indians, and to North America." C. ROMERO BARCELO, STATEHOOD IS FOR THE POOR 13 (1975).
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2. The African Heritage
Spain's initial interest in Puerto Rico was prompted by tales of
huge gold deposits. After the few mines were depleted, Spanish
rulers turned to agriculture, introducing a plantation economy
based on the cultivation of sugar cane and coffee by slave labor.
Spain introduced slavery into Puerto Rico in 1510, but because of
the limited development of commercial agriculture during the
first three centuries of Spanish rule, it played a minor role in
Puerto Rico's insular development. The practice of manumission,
long established in Spain itself, served to increase the number of
free blacks in Puerto Rico during periods of commercial decline.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the program
of commercial agricultural exploitation began in earnest, the free
black population was very large,' exceeding by many thousands
the number of slaves This situation, combined with a growing
mixed ethnic population, prevented blacks in Puerto Rico from
forming a separate sociocultural element,8 despite Spanish at-
tempts to segregate the races.' Continued intermarriage has not
eliminated color as a factor in Puerto Rican life, 0 but has relieved
its impact so that color discrimination is not as pronounced in
Puerto Rico as in the United States." Many Independentista and
Commonwealth partisans consider racial discrimination in the
States as the great divider between the two societies, although
the available evidence suggests that black Puerto Ricans generally
favor closer ties with the States and Statehood for the island. 2
An 1860 census counted 241,015 free, colored persons and 41,736 slaves, and numbered
the Spanish at 300,430. F. RIBES TOVAR, A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF PUERTO Rico 291
(1973).
' Slavery was abolished .in Puerto Rico in 1873. For the definitive history of slavery in
Puerto Rico, available only in Spanish, see L. DIAZ SOLER, HISTORIA DE LA ESCLAVITUDE DE
PUERTO Rico (1953).
J. STEWARD, THE PEOPLE OF PUERTO Rico: A STUDY IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 496 (1956).
' Under the Cedula de Gracias of 1815, the property clause granted white immigrants
twice the amount of land for cultivation granted to Negro or "mixed" immigrants. In 1833,
Negroes were banned from military service and in 1848, following a series of abortive slave
revolts, the Governor-General invoked the Black Code (Codigo Negro), which subjected free
blacks and slaves to judgment by court martial. Id. at 496.
" By 1899, the proportion of Negroes was only 25%, decreasing to 20% in 1930, 15% in
1950, and 7% in 1965. Sagrera noted that "[h]ere the problem of race does not exist. This
problem is being solved by the evolution of the Negro race. Here the Negro race has been
fusing with other races and the Negro is disappearing. The evolution will continue and the
problem will be resolved." M. SAGRERA, supra note 2, at 52.
" "Color discrimination in general is a subtle and minor theme in Puerto Rican life." M.
TUMIN & A. FELDMAN, SOCIAL CLASS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN PUERTO Rico 239 (1971).
12 M. SAGRERA, supra note 2, at 32.
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During most of the twentieth century, African culture has been
ignored" or belittled by Puerto Rican intellectuals." In recent
years, the cultural recognition of African roots of Puerto Rico has
increased. However, the issue of merging the African cultural
past with the predominant Spanish emphasis of the island while
maintaining a distinctive African role is still unresolved.
3. The Spanish Heritage
Regardless of the recognition given to the African roots of
many Puerto Ricans, the major cultural issue with respect to the
United States concerns the retention of the island's Spanish
heritage. During the nineteenth century, a large population in-
crease in Puerto Rico, from approximately 150,000 people in 1800
to a million by the end of the century, 1 resulted largely from the
influx of Spanish royalists fleeing revolutions throughout Central
and South America. The emigration shifted the balance in Puerto
Rico between the black and Indian populations and the Spanish
population in favor of the Spanish." Although the immediate im-
pact was in the political arena, the long-range impact was cultural.
Growth in political awareness coincided with growth in popula-
tion and Puerto Ricans insisted upon increased participation in
the virtually totalitarian government. The struggle for greater
political participation is reflected in the Grito de Lares of 1868, a
brief, unsuccessful rebellion against the Spanish-appointed gover-
nor. Attempts to achieve self-government intensified in the years
following the rebellion. In 1897, under the guidance of Luis Munoz
Rivera, Puerto Rico negotiated a Charter of Autonomy with the
Spanish Crown. Although the Charter is viewed as a major
triumph in the struggle for autonomy, the appointed governor
was empowered to veto legislation and suppress civil rights in
" "When they talk about 'race', it means that of the Spanish, the race of the discover-
ers ... and this and nothing else we boast about in Puerto Rican poetry." CRUZ, NARCISSUS
DISCOVERS His ANCESTORS (1975). See also SOTO, DICTIONARY OF REGIONALISMS OF PUERTO
RICAN POETRY (1961). Similarly, Ren6 Marques, in his famous introduction to the first collec-
tion of Puerto Rican short stories, Cuentos Puertor-riquenos de Hoy (1959), ignores the
African influence on Puerto Rican literary tradition.
" Thus, Pedreira, in his classic work INSULARISMO (1930), ascribes the indecisive, non-
heroic traits of the Puerto Rican to his African background and the intellectual force and
vigor to the Spanish heritage.
" [1900] Bur. of Census, col. 1, pt. 53, at 53-59, table 1. The exact statistics for 1800 and
1899 are 155, 426 and 953, 243 respectively.
16 G. LEWIS, PUERTO RICO: FREEDOM AND POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN 58 (1963).
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emergencies. This struggle produced the heroes of modern Puerto
Rico, and was a factor in the formation of attitudes causing Puerto
Rico to view itself as an island within the Spanish cultural
sphere. 8 The struggle for autonomy reached its climax in the
"Generation of 1930," which set forth a strong statement of the
need to protect the people of Puerto Rico from cultural extinction
by reaffirming their Spanish roots. 9
The nature of Puerto Rico's identity is subject to considerable
speculation and analysis, but at its core is a feeling of Puerto
Rican nationalism, the feeling that "the island is a socio-cultural
entity ... that it functions as a unit and has problems which must
be solved in insular terms."2° The Spanish language is the most ob-
vious embodiment of unity and cultural strength. One Puerto
Rican commentator observed that "[oln the future development of
the Spanish language rests the future of the people of Puerto Rico
... if, perhaps, the language is in danger it is because so is the na-
tional personality."21 Although attempts to characterize Puerto
Rico's cultural identity in greater detail necessarily vary, the
characterization consciously relates to Spanish and European
values.' Whatever their vision of the long-term goal for the
" Charter of Autonomy, in THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO Rico, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF PUERTO Rico (1962).
" See, e.g., statement of Jose Antonio Ortiz, Secretary General, Puerto Rican Indepen-
dent Party, before the UNITED STATES-PUERTO Rico COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF PUERTO
RIco, SOCIAL CULTURAL HEARINGS, S. Doc. No. 108, Vol. Z, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)
[hereinafter cited as SOCIAL CULTURAL HEARINGS]. Ortiz dated Puerto Rican nationality
from 1804, when Puerto Rico gained representation in the Spanish Parliament.
" See, e.g., A. PEDREIRA, INSULARISMO (1934). See also Cruz Monclova, The Puerto Rican
Political Movement in the 19th Century, in UNITED STATES-PUERTO Rico COMMISSION ON THE
STATUS OF PUERTO RICO, SELECTED BACKGROUND STUDIES (1966) [hereinafter cited as
SELECTED BACKGROUND STUDIES].
U J. STEWARD, supra note 8, at 499. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, key
figures in Puerto Rico began referring to the island as "our native land," "beloved country,"
and "sacred native soil." SELECTED BACKGROUND STUDIES, supra note 19, at 17.
11 G. DE GRANDA GUTIERREZ, TRANSCULTURACION E INTERFERENCIA LINGUISTICA EN EL
PUERTO RICO CONTEMPORANEO 181 (1969).
' Sidney Mintz reviewed the literature in Puerto Rico: An Essay in the Definition of a
National Culture, in SELECTED BACKGROUND STUDIES, supra note 19, at 371. Mintz disagrees
with the assumption of cultural unity, although he recognizes that Puerto Rican commen-
taries have engaged in this approach:
Among the value statements that find support in the literature are the following:
the near-universal use of Spanish and its attached sentimental significance; the
meaning of Puerto Rico's distinctive character as 'a Catholic country'; the
underlying acceptance of a stratified society, with behavioral accompaniments at-
tuned to near-automatic deference on the one hand, and the unchallenged exercise
of authority on the other; the belief in the integrity of the individual based upon
an inner worth, unrelated to worldly status or accomplishment; a humanistic view
216 [Vol. 11:2
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island, all parties in Puerto Rico agree to the necessity of preserv-
ing the Spanish cultural identity" against the challenge of
technological change, the United States value system, and the
English language.24
One's perception of the nature and dynamics of Puerto Rican
culture relates closely to one's view of the appropriate United
States-Puerto Rico relationship.5 Independence partisans main-
tain that Puerto Ricans possess all the attributes of a nation: a
defined territory, a relatively homogeneous population, a common.
language, a common set of values and behavior patterns, and a
common history. The culture, perforce, is a national culture, and
of the world, with social values put above scientific values; a double sexual stan-
dard with a very strong emphasis on female chastity and a belief in the natural in-
feriority of women; a much-elaborated set of values dealing with maleness and
male authority (machismo); a reliance on shame, rather than guilt, as a source of
social control, and a dependence on the opinions of others in forming and main-
taining one's opinion of oneself, accompanied by a strong gregariousness and
dislike of solitude and of loneliness; and a dependence on others, expressed in
docility, the inability to make difficult decisions, and the unwillingness to handle
problems by directly confronting them.
Id.
The issue of Catholic values rarely has been discussed although the interest that Puerto
Rico exhibits concerning aid to parochial schools and resistance to the enforcement of the
Supreme Court abortion decision reflects those concerns. See Ortiz v. Hernandez Colon.,
385 F. Supp. 111 (D.P.R. 1974). There is a growing Protestant population estimated at
700,000, which approximates the number of Catholic churchgoers. Liden, Protestants in
Puerto Rico No Longer a Silent Minority, San Juan Star, Dec. 19, 1978, at 1.
The importance of maintaining the integrity of the Spanish language in Puerto Rico
was emphasized by Jaime Benitez, a Commonwealth supporter who was Resident Commis-
sioner from 1972-1976, in the SOCIAL CULTURAL HEARINGS, supra note 18, at 354-55.
"4 The role the English language plays in United States life, and its official and practical
importance are discussed in A. LEIBOWITZ, THE OFFICIAL CHARACTER OF LANGUAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1979, National Institute of Education); see also Leibowitz, English
Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 7 (1969).
1 See J. SILEN, HACIA UNA VISION POSITIVA DEL PUERTORIQUENA (1972); H. WELLS, THE
MODERNIZATION OF PUERTO RICO: A POLITICAL STUDY OF CHANGING VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS
188-89 (1969); A. PEDREIRA, supra note 19, at 162. For the contemporary generation, the
issue has been formulated in terms of the social and economic transformation of Puerto
Rico. Those who contend that Puerto Rico has bartered its identity for material well-being
view the industrialization of Puerto Rico as a thinly-disguised, massive engulfment by the
United States of the Spanish culture. Others argue that Puerto Rico's fundamental
character remains intact, and that what is taken for "Americanization" is the "moderniza-
tion" craved by every less developed country in the world. It is also asserted that what has
been destroyed in Puerto Rico is an outdated, agricultural community on which a host of
traditional values were based, and that those traditional values have been replaced by a
modern set of values without damaging the fundamental character of Puerto Rican culture.
Some observers, while admitting strong United States influence, also discern the creation
of a positive new culture in Puerto Rico, which combines the most vigorous features of the
cultures of the two communities.
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advocates of independence urge that its corresponding political
status should be that of a sovereign national entity in order to
achieve its highest and most creative capability. Commonwealth
partisans view the Puerto Rican identity as based not only on the
nation/state, but also as part of a new federal and regional rela-
tionship, capable of retaining distinctiveness while engaging the
United States and other cultural worlds. Status as a Com-
monwealth or Associated State, it is argued, would perpetuate the
mutually enriching interchange of cultural traits without loss of
identity. Proponents of Statehood maintain that American
federalism is sufficiently flexible not only to allow but also to
welcome the admission of a culturally distinctive Puerto Rico as a
State. They cite Hawaii particularly, not only because it is non-
contiguous, but also due to its largely non-Anglo-Saxon cultural
and ethnic background. Statehood advocates, such as Governor
Romero Barcelo, cite federal constitutional protections for the
States in such matters as education, marital relations, public
morality, health, and welfare to show the potential for States to
retain cultural distinctiveness.
B. Relationship with the United States
Spanish colonialism in Puerto Rico came to an abrupt halt on July
25, 1898, when as a consequence of the Spanish-American War,
United States troops landed at Guanica on Puerto Rico's south
coast. Spain subsequently ceded Puerto Rico to the United States.
The Treaty of Paris provided that the civil rights and political
status of the native inhabitants of the territory would be deter-
mined by the United States Congress." Even under Spanish rule,
the United States was the major market for the Puerto Rican
economy and there was considerable optimism at the transfer.
Some, like the Puerto Rican Federal Party, anticipated that the
island would become a territory and that full Statehood would
follow promptly. Others, such as the Puerto Rican Autonomist
Party, envisioned greater autonomy for Puerto Rico, building
upon the island's recent triumph in its status struggle with Spain.
Puerto Ricans generally expected the initial self-governing role
under United States sovereignty to be greater than that obtained
from Spain under the Charter of Autonomy. Much of the bit-
terness of the following years resulted from the failure of the
federal government to fulfill these expectations. For example,
Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, art. IX, 30 Stat. 1754, 1759, T.S. No. 343.
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President McKinley's Puerto Rican policy, which was incor-
porated in the Foraker Act of 1900, established a civil government
in which the key roles would be given to Americans appointed by
the President.'
United States language policy was even more disappointing. At
the outset, the federal government did not regard the problem of
language in Puerto Rico as particularly difficult. Since education
under the Spanish was limited to a small elite and because many
in Puerto Rico were eager for Statehood, it was assumed that
English would be integrated easily, and that it would become the
operative language of the island. With this attitude prevailing,
the issue of whether English was to be the language of instruction
in the school system did not appear significant. No clear demarca-
tion was made between the use of English as the language of in-
struction' and other methods of encouraging the shift of the
populace to English. Although Congress may have been insen-
sitive to Puerto Rico's desires, it was, nevertheless, proceeding
within the United States historical experience. The approach was
similar to the action taken to organize governments in new ter-
ritories of the continental United States and to prepare newly-
settled areas for Statehood.' The imposition of English as the
language of instruction in the Puerto Rican school system, on an
island in which very few people knew the language, had within it
the arrogance inherent in imperialism as well as the recognition
that language differences might impede Statehood.31
The legal power of the federal government with respect to the
territories was tested in the courts during this period. For the
first time - Hawaii also had just been acquired - the United States
was governing territories that were geographically separated
from the mainland and inhabited by people culturally and racially
" The Foraker Act of 1900, ch. 191, §§ 1-41, 31 Stat. 77 (current version in scattered sec-
tions of 11, 48 U.S.C. (1976)). The Act provided for a Governor appointed by the President,
an 11-person Executive Council (with a majority being Statesiders), 35 elected Puerto
Ricans in the House of Delegates (whose laws were subject to Congressional veto), and an
elected Resident Commissioner who spoke for Puerto Rico in the United States House of
Representatives but who had no vote there. Id.
[1904] GOVERNOR OF PUERTO Rico FOURTH ANN. REP. 13.
[1903] U.S. COMMISSION OF EDUCATION IN PUERTO Rico ANN. REP. 21 (1903).
'o Leibowitz, United States Federalism: The States and the Territories, 28 AMER. U. L.
REV. 449, 455 (1979).
31 For educational requirements in other territories and in the United States, see A.
LEIBOWITZ, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE: THE IMPOSITION OF ENGLISH
AS THE LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1970, Center for Applied
Linguistics).
1981] 219
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
distinct from that of the continental United States. The legal
debate centered upon basic questions. For example, does the Con-
stitution follow the flag? Does the Constitution protect the
residents of Puerto Rico by limiting federal, executive, and Con-
gressional action? However, what was at issue was whether the
usual pattern of territorial evolution leading toward Statehood (as
set forth in the Northwest Ordinance) would be changed.
The Insular Cases 2 created the distinction between an unincor-
porated and incorporated territory. The Constitution was held to
apply fully to incorporated territories, but only those fundamental
rights essential to the citizens of the United States were provided
to unincorporated territories. The various decisions in the Insular
Cases permitted virtually unlimited Congressional power over
unincorporated territories, without the evolutionary guidelines of
the Northwest Ordinance." Puerto Rico was an unincorporated
territory dependent upon Congressional action to decide when its
territorial status would change and under what circumstances the
Constitution would apply. In a concurring opinion, Justice White
wrote that "[it] must follow ... that incorporation does not arise
until in the wisdom of Congress it is deemed that the acquired ter-
ritory has reached that state where it is proper that it should
enter . . . the American family."' This judicial action, confirming
the executive and legislative approach, embittered the island's
populace. The broadly-based Union Party, which held power from
1904 to 1934, made continuous demands for a plebiscite on alter-
native ultimate status preferences to remove the status initiative
from exclusive United States control. Independence sentiment
grew as Congress ignored these demands and the United States-
appointed governors became increasingly unresponsive. Puerto
Rico found itself contending, as it had under the Spanish, for
greater control over its own affairs and for a legal limitation on
1 DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1900); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1900); Arm-
strong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1900); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1900)
[hereinafter cited as the Insular Cases].
" For a review of the impact of the Insular Cases on United States territorial policy, see
Leibowitz, supra note 30, at 458-63. For Puerto Rico commentary on the Insular Cases, see
Fuster, The Origins of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation and its Implications
Regarding the Power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to Regulate Interstate Com-
merce, 43 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 259 (1974), and Ramirez, Los Cases Insulares, 16 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 121 (1946).
, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 339 (1900) (White, J., concurring). The deference to
Congressional action persists. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 435 U.S. 1 (1979), and Guam v.
Olson, 431 U.S. 195 (1977).
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federal power. The federal government resisted these efforts and
the confrontation continued. 5
III. THE ORGANIC ACT OF 1917:
THE GRANT OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP
A. The Jones Act
The election of Woodrow Wilson, combined with Democratic
majorities in both Houses of Congress, led to the passage of the
Revised Organic Act of 1917 (the Jones Act).3  It included provi-
sions for a bill of rights for Puerto Rico, a collective conferral of
citizenship, and a locally-elected Senate of nineteen members.
Under the Act, the majority of the department heads and the
island magistrates were to be appointed -with the advice and con-
sent of the new Senate-by the Governor. This formal transfer of
power from Congress and the federal government to the local of-
ficials was limited since the Governor, the Attorney General, the
Commissioner of Education, and the Auditor were to be appointed
by the President, as were the members of the Puerto Rican
Supreme Court. 7
B. United States Citizenship
The greatest debate concerned the "grant" of citizenship. The
Treaty of Paris of 1899 and the Foraker Act of 1900 specifically
withheld U.S. citizenship from Puerto Ricans,' although it is moot
whether persons born in Puerto Rico were citizens under the Con-
stitution regardless of Congressional action., Under the Foraker
Act, the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, with certain minor excep-
tions, became citizens of Puerto Rico, as did their children. The
Jones Act of 1917 conferred U.S. citizenship upon all citizens of
' Hunter, Historical Survey of the Puerto Rico Status Question 1898-1965, in SELECTED
BACKGROUND STUDIES, supra note 19, at 76-112.
" Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act of 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (codified in scattered
sections of 48 U.S.C. (1976)).
Id. The immediate result of the Jones Act was that the federally-appointed Governors
were opposed by the Puerto Rican legislature. Every year the Governor had to veto a large
number of bills, many of which were passed merely for political effect without any hope or
expectation that they would become law.
Treaty of Paris, supra note 26, at art. IX.
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). The question was raised but
avoided by the Supreme Court when it held that an inhabitant of Puerto Rico was not an
alien for the purpose of immigration laws in force at that time. Gonzalez v. Williams, 192
U.S. 1 (1904). See also Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
19811
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Puerto Rico.'" This imposition of citizenship, a turning point in
United States-Puerto Rico relations, transpired although Puerto
Rican feelings at the time were divided on the issue. The
Republican Party of Puerto Rico and the labor movement both
favored Statehood and were ardent supporters of American
citizenship. Their views were transmitted to the Congress. 1
However, these groups constituted a minority in insular politics.
The majority Unionist Party of Puerto Rico favored increased
autonomy and expressed a preference for the designation of
"citizens of Puerto Rico."'" They claimed that a substantial
number of their fellow citizens would reject American citizenship
if it were offered.'3 Independence partisans today continue to note
the omission of an option. The fact that citizenship coincided with
World War I and that the new citizens were immediately eligible
for conscription is also cited." Although it was believed in some
quarters, particularly among pro-Statehood Puerto Ricans, that
the grant of citizenship implied incorporation of Puerto Rico into
the Union as a territory, as it had for Alaska,' 5 the United States
Supreme Court in Balzac v. Puerto Rico"6 held otherwise, once
40 Jones Act, ch. 145, §5, 39 Stat. 953 (1917) (repealed 1952). It would appear that the Act
conferred naturalized citizenship as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23)(1976). In 1940, by
amendment to the Nationality Act, persons born in Puerto Rico after Jan. 13, 1941, were
deemed citizens of the United States by birth. Id. § 1402. The Commonwealth proposed, in
the Fernos-Murray Bill, that all persons born in Puerto Rico on or after April 11, 1899,
would be citizens as if born in a State of the Union. H.R. RES. 5926, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
art. V(b), (1959).
" H. R. REP. No. 341, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1912) (quoting a report by the Secretary of
War).
See A Civil Government For Puerto Rico: Hearings on H. R. 13818 Before the House
Comm. on Insular Affairs, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess. 53, 67 (1914) (Statements of Luis M. Rivera
and Frank Martinez).
53 CONG. REC. 7472 (1916). During the floor debate, Resident Commissioner Munoz
Rivera expressed this point, and suggested that a plebiscite be held to determine whether
Puerto Ricans desired American citizenship. Id.
" M. DENIS, PUERTO RIco: A SocIo-HISTORIC INTERPRETATION 108 (1972). One commen-
tator believes that conscription played no part in the consideration and that Puerto Ricans
were eligible for the draft before the citizenship provision. Cabranes, Citizenship and the
American Empire: Notes on the Legislative History of the U.S. Citizenship of Puerto Rico,
127 U. PENN. L. REV. 391 (1978).
,5 Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
258 U.S. 298 (1922). Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion continued the approach he
had adopted as President, noting the cultural and racial difference in Puerto Rico
in explaining why the island had not been incorporated despite the grant of citizenship. Ex-
amples of this attitude are evident in the following passages: "We need not dwell on
another consideration which requires us not lightly to infer, from acts thus easily explained
on other grounds, an intention to incorporate in the Union these distant ocean communities
of a different origin and language from those of our continental people." Id. at 311.
But Alaska was a very different case from that of Porto Rico. It was an enormous
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again separating Puerto Rico from the evolutionary pattern of
other territories.
The significance to be accorded the grant of citizenship has
never been resolved. The unilateral conferral of citizenship was
considered important by both Puerto Rico and the United States;
in Puerto Rico as an act of legal consequence, but in the United
States Congress as primarily one of psychological significance.
Despite the grant of citizenship, Congress continued to treat
United States citizens in Puerto Rico as aliens for a variety of pur-
poses. In the key areas of political and economic participation,
citizenship was of no consequence. In recent years, Puerto Rico
has sought unsuccessfully to give effect to the grant of citizenship
in these areas through the judiciary.
In the area of political participation, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that Stateside political
standards-one person-one vote-applied in a city council election
in Puerto Rico under the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals examined Puerto
Rico's Commonwealth status at some length, noting "its sovereign
status and functional independence from Congressional control."'"
But the court held that Commonwealth status required Special
protection of the Commonwealth's citizens against unwarranted
and otherwise insufficiently checked governmental action. The
court concluded:
We yield to no one in our regard for the Supreme Court of Puer-
to Rico, but at the same time, if citizens of the several states
may call for an initial decision in the district court without
deferring to the courts of their local state, we must wonder how
we could conscientiously hold that under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 United
States citizens resident in Puerto Rico are any less entitled."
A similar issue arose with respect to the rights of citizens of Puer-
to Rico to vote in presidential elections. The United States
District Court in Puerto Rico held that until Statehood, or until a
constitutional amendment is approved that extends the presiden-
territory, very sparsely settled and offering opportunity for immigration and set-
tlement by American citizens. It was on the American continent and within easy
reach of the then United States. It involved none of the difficulties which incor-
poration of the Philippines and Porto Rico presents.
Id. at 309.
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tial vote to Puerto Rico, there is no substantial constitutional
question."0 In short, citizenship brought with it federal judicial
scrutiny of local legislative bodies, but not participation in the na-
tional legislative or executive branches.
Citizens of Puerto Rico also raised the question of economic par-
ticipation in various federal programs. There is no consistent pat-
tern for this assistance; in some cases Puerto Rico is treated as a
State, in others it is afforded special treatment,51 almost always to
its disadvantage. Discrimination is effected by excluding Puerto
Rico and other off-shore areas from government programs or by
including them within the program but applying the formula for
distribution in a different fashion than that applied for States.
The standard method used is the "set-aside," a separate and
distinct allocation formula. From the total amount appropriated
for a particular program, a statutorily determined percentage,
usually two or three percent, is set aside for allocation among the
outlying areas according to their respective needs. The set-aside
procedure originally was established in the National School Lunch
50 Id. Sanchez v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 239 (D.P.R. 1974).
Computation of total federal benefits is difficult because of problems of definition and
the differing operation of federal programs. The United States-Puerto Rico Commission on
the Status of Puerto Rico calculated that Puerto Rico received total grants-in-aid and
transfer payments of $92.9 million in fiscal year 1964, which would have been increased by
$85.5 million if Puerto Rico were a State. The Status Commission computed the net flow of
federal funds to Puerto Rico at $313 million, which would have been reduced to $226.9
million if it were a state. UNITED STATES-PUERTO Rico COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF PUER-
TO RIco, STATUS OF PUERTO Rico 87-89 (Tables B-2 & B-3) (1966) [hereinafter cited as STATUS
COMMISSION REPORT). The major factor in these total flow figures is the federal tax exemp-
tion. See also Hearings on H.R. 9234 Before a Special Subcomm. on Territorial and Insular
Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. 429-36
(1959) (Statement of Luis A. Ferre), and Hearings on Puerto Rico Before the Subcomm. on
Territorial and Insular Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 148-56 (Statement of Dr. Arthur E. Burns); 264-66 (Comments of Dr. Rafael
de Jesus Toro). Recent analyses have been less thorough and have focused on the federal
grant-in-aid programs. See Andic, Economic and Fiscal Implications of the Presidential
Vote; and Capalli, The Potential Impact of the Presidential Vote on Puerto Rico's Par-
ticipation in Federal Aid Programs, in SIX SPECIAL STUDIES REQUESTED FOR THE AD Hoc
ADVISORY GROUP ON THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR PUERTO Rico (1971). The first comprehen-
sive review of Puerto Rico participation in federal programs was R. CAPALLI, FEDERAL AID
TO PUERTO Rico (1970). For a more current analysis of the federal programs, see the detail-
ed examination by the Institute of International Law and Economic Development (IILED)
of federal programs in Puerto Rico submitted to the Department of Commerce for the
Inter-Agency Study Group on Puerto Rico. (3 Vols. 1978). See also A. BAKER, ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF A CHANGE FROM COMMONWEALTH TO STATESIDE TREATMENT (Office of Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, 1976); and Report of the HEW Under-Secretary's Advisory
Group to Puerto Rico (1976).
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Act of 1946.52 The basic unfairness involved in the set-aside pro-
cedure is that the need the program seeks to meet often ceases to be
the key operating variable when the program moves from the
States to the off-shore areas. Rather, political power or its
absence appears to be the sole determinant of need.
In the early days cf the Commonwealth, Puerto Rico accepted
differential treatment because the funds were less significant in
both relative and absolute terms and because the policy coincided
with the Commonwealth's desire to be treated specially. As the
funds increased, the Commonwealth could not afford the distinc-
tion. Since 1970, both Commonwealth and Statehood advocates
have sought equal treatment for Puerto Rico in federal grant par-
ticipation.'
United States citizens from the States challenged the economic
discrimination when, after arriving in Puerto Rico from New
York, their payments under Supplemental Security Income
(SSI-assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled) were reduced
severely. The Supreme Court, per curiam in Califano v. Torres,"
upheld the statute against the argument that it infringed upon the
federal right to travel. In 1980, in Harris v. Rosario,' the Court,
again per curiam, upheld the discrimination in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program against an equal protection
' National School Lunch Act of 1946, ch. 281, §§ 3, 4, 60 Stat. 230 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1751-1768 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The only statement of Congressional policy
toward set-asides indicates that special limitations were necessary with respect to Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands because both receive, under the normal allocation formula,
larger grants than any of the States. S. REP. No. 1677, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in
[1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2109, 2111. Capalli, supra note 51, discusses the set-
aside issue in considerable detail.
' IILED, supra note 51. However, despite the unequal treatment, federal funds con-
stituted over 32% of Puerto Rico's recurrent receipts in the years 1970-1977. In both 1976
and 1977, net federal expenditures, exceeded 30% of the Commonwealth's gross product. In
1976, net federal transfer payments supplied almost 16% of personal income on the island.
Data for 1970-1972, comparing Puerto Rico to selected States, suggest that the per capita
tax dollars available to the Commonwealth from all sources (local revenues plus federal
transfers) are lower than those available to the poorer states of the Union, somewhat less
than Alabama or Arkansas and substantially below those available to Mississippi. At the
same time, Puerto Rico's own tax effort is higher than the combined state and local tax ef-
fort of these States, 15.7% of total personal income compared to 10% for Mississippi, and
8% for Alabama and Arkansas. The data were gathered by the HEW Undersecretary's Ad-
visory Group on Puerto Rico (1976).
5' 435 U.S. 1 (1978). The lower court decisions in a related case, unmentioned. by the
Supreme Court in its opinion, were in favor of equal treatment for U.S. citizens residing in
Puerto Rico. Rodriguez-Cintron v. Richardson, No. 1099-72 (D.P.R. 1975); see also Cruz
Morell v. Weinberger, No. 75-1050 (D.P.R. 1976).
446 U.S. 651 (1980).
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challenge. The Court in Califano v. Torres distinguished Shapiro
v. Thompson" and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,57 which
had set aside State residency requirements as a condition of
receiving welfare and medical benefits, on the ground that since
Puerto Rican citizens receive less benefits than Statesiders, to
permit plaintiffs to prevail would require that they be accorded
special benefits over the island residents. Ironically, the Court
dismissed the equal protection argument in Califano v. Torres on
the ground that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico status "has no
parallel in history."5' In Rosario, the Court held that under the
Territorial Clause5 Congress "may treat Puerto Rico differently
from States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions."'
The logic is difficult to follow. The consequence of ruling for the
plaintiffs would be that all residents of Puerto Rico would be ac-
corded equal treatment. To argue that plaintiffs should lose so
that residents of Puerto Rico could continue to be discriminated
against by the United States is simply to reiterate the conclusion.
The holding "justified" the Congressional action on the basis that
Puerto Rican residents do not pay taxes, that the cost to the
federal treasury would be great, and that inclusion in the SSI pro-
gram might seriously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy
(presumably by acting as a disincentive to work). Because federal
law establishes Puerto Rico's tax status, the argument in favor of
the Congressional action on this ground is circular. Congress can,
by the Court's reasoning, discriminate against territorial citizens
by passing legislation relating to their income tax payments. No
State citizen would be subjected to the question of whether inclu-
sion of its State's citizens would be costly to the treasury. Citizens
eligible for SSI are by definition not big taxpayers and whether
these payments act as a disincentive to work and are therefore
potentially disruptive to the State's economy is an issue most rele-
vant at the federal level.
The Rosario decision may be contrasted with the Court's
language in Foley v. Connelie,1 with respect to discrimination
j 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
415 U.S. 250 (1974).
435 U.S. 1, 3 (1978).
" U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory ... belonging to the United States."
For a treatment of the history of the Territorial Clause, see Liebowitz, supra note 30, at
454.
60 446 U.S. 651, 652 (1980).
"1 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
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against aliens. "The Court has treated certain restrictions
(welfare assistance) on aliens with 'heightened judicial solicitude'
... a treatment deemed necessary since aliens.., have no direct
voice in the political process.""2 The Court appears to be limiting
its judicial solicitude when citizens rather than aliens are involv-
ed, although these citizens of the territories, like the aliens, do not
have a direct voice in the political process. Furthermore, the
"compelling state interest" test required in certain equal protec-
tion cases was not even discussed in Rosario. Instead, the "ra-
tional basis" test was used. Justice Marshall dissented in both
Califano v. Torres and Rosario, somewhat timidly questioning the
desirability of permitting Congress to treat territorial residents in
this fashion, but without suggesting the importance of the citizen-
ship grant. He desired closer scrutiny of the distinction, a premise
that accepts discrimination against territorial citizens under cer-
tain circumstances.
The grant of citizenship in 1917 also complicated the federal
government's attitude toward the use of the vernacular, Spanish,
in Puerto Rico. In 1916, the Commissioner of Education softened
the requirement that English be the exclusive language of instruc-
tion in the school system. Although this new policy was adopted in
part because of the practical difficulty of obtaining American
teachers, the relaxation of the English language instruction re-
quirement took place at the time the United States was becoming
less certain of Puerto Rico's ultimate future.
IV. THE 1930s: GROWING NATIONALISM AND
INTEREST IN INDEPENDENCE
A. Economic Problems
Despite political uncertainty and frustration on the island, there
was significant economic progress until the late 1920s, when two
hurricanes and the Depression brought a virtual economic col-
lapse. The 1930s were terrible years; starvation and unemploy-
ment abounded. The economic conditions brought with them an
upsurge of nationalism among members of Puerto Rico's political
and intellectual elite. Cultural nationalism coincided with the
revitalization of the Nationalist Party. In the 1932 election, the
Nationalist Party received less than 12,000 votes for the Senator-
at-large position (only three percent of the total vote), and the rest
62 Id. at 294.
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of the ticket received considerably less. Following the election
debacle, the Party resorted to terrorism and sabotage. As a
response, in 1936, Senator Millard Tydings, with the covert sup-
port of the Roosevelt Administration, submitted a bill6" providing
for independence in four years, with tariffs rising twenty-five per-
cent each year. The bill was designed to stem the independence
movement by forcing nationalist partisans to face harsh economic
reality. The Tydings bill, and the subsequent Dorfman Report,"
with its bleak prophecy of Puerto Rico's economic condition, had
the desired effect. Luis Munoz-Marin and other Puerto Rican
leaders reappraised the independence alternative and gave prior-
ity to the economic problems of Puerto Rico.'
B. The Language Issue
The language question was also nearing a climax during this
period. The issue was focused increasingly upon English as the
medium of instruction. The rise of the militant Puerto Rican Na-
tionalist Party and the strong advocacy in Puerto Rico for in-
dependence converted the question of whether the island would
accept the imposition of English as the language of instruction in-
to an issue of sovereign prerogative. President Roosevelt ad-
dressed the problem, terming the grant of citizenship an obliga-
tion to learn English.
There . . . is no desire or purpose to diminish the enjoyment or
the usefulness of the rich Spanish cultural legacy of the people
of Puerto Rico. What is necessary, however, is that the
American citizens of Puerto Rico should profit from their unique
geographical situation and the unique historical circumstance
which has brought to them the blessings of American citizenship
by becoming bilingual. But bilingualism will be achieved by the
forthcoming generation of Puerto Ricans only if the teaching of
English throughout the insular educational system is entered in-
to at once with vigor, purposefulness and devotion, and with the
understanding that English is the official language of our coun-
try."
S. 4529, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 80 CONG. REC. 5925-27 (1936).
" U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, THE ECONOMY OF PUERTO Rico 18-20 (1946).
Per capita income was $118 a year; farm work- the main source of employment-paid
as low as $.06 an hour. The labor class-construction workers-earned $.22 an hour. Seven
out of ten persons were still illiterate and the life expectancy was only 46 years.
" Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Jos6 M. Gallardo (April 17, 1937), reprinted in
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE CONSTITUTION
PREVAILS, 1937 at 160-61 (1941).
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Congress took a similar position, despite adverse testimony by Dr.
Jose' Gallardo, the Commissioner of Education. 7
The Popular Democratic Party (PDP), founded by Luis Munoz-
Marin in 1938, campaigned and gained power in 1940 on the slogan
that "status was not an issue" and that the question should be set
aside temporarily to address pressing economic problems." The
PDP sought to transform the island from an agricultural to an in-
dustrial society by increasing private investment from outside the
island. This was to be accomplished through an industrial tax ex-
emption program, which went into effect in 1947. Other in-
ducements included the Fair Labor Standards Act, which permit-
ted, inter alia, Puerto Rican industries to pay lower wages than
the States under certain circumstances, Government Develop-
ment Bank low interest loans, and special marketing studies. 9
Although the PDP had campaigned on a platform that pledged
to put aside status politics, upon accession to office it undertook
new initiatives to increase autonomy. The emphasis on local
autonomy permitted the PDP to resolve quickly the formal aspect
of the language issue in the school system. In 1946, the Puerto
Rican legislature passed a bill providing that Spanish should be
the language of instruction in the public schools and that the
teaching of English as a subject should be compulsory in all the
public schools. The bill was vetoed by Acting Governor Manuel A.
Perez, an executive branch appointee, and passed over his veto.
Under the procedure then operative, the bill then went to the
President. In vetoing the bill, President Truman expressly linked
language to ultimate political status and stated:
I have not considered the merits of the pedagogical program
which the bill would introduce into the insular public school
system. I base my disapproval, instead, on the untimeliness of
Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee Investigating Economic and Social Conditions
in Puerto Rico, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, 230-31 (1943). See also Gallardo's testimony to
the same effect before the Bell Committee. Hearings of the House Committee Investigating
Political Economic and Social Conditions in Puerto Rico, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 734-35
(1943).
" The rise of the Popular Democratic Party has been chronicled many times. A good
review in English is R. ANDERSON, PARTY POLITICS IN PUERTO Rico (1965). See also K. FARR,
PERSONALISM AND PARTY POLITICS: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PAR-
TY OF PUERTO RICO (1973), which discusses the party after Munoz-Marin departed. C.
GOODSELL, ADMINISTRATION OF A REVOLUTION (1965) discusses the people around Munoz dur-
ing the early period.
" The history of Puerto Rico's economic development is set forth in Chapter 1 of the IIL-
ED study, supra note 51, and H. WELLS, THE MODERNIZATION OF PUERTO RICO (1969).
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the measure and my feeling that the issue of Puerto Rican
political status would be confused and its solution delayed by
the adoption just now of a new language policy. Important as
the language question may be, I regard the reaching of a perma-
nent and satisfactory solution to political status as of greater im-
portance, and I cannot permit a measure to stand which, in my
opinion, would jeopardize that solution.0
In 1948, Puerto Rico elected its first governor and the issue was
resolved in favor of Spanish as the medium of instruction. One
observer noted that "Spanish will be the vehicle of instruction in
the high school. This change, which responds to a long-felt need,
extends indefinitely the use of the vernacular as the teaching
means until the last year of high school."71 Gradually, English was
reduced to the same status as any other principal subject in the
curriculum. 2
Although the issue of language policy being imposed from
without is no longer present, the issue of the role of English in the
school system still has political overtones in Puerto Rico. The
1966 Report of the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the
Status of Puerto Rico" addressed the question and suggested the
possibility of Statehood with only a modest cultural accommoda-
tion:
Statehood would necessarily involve a cultural and language ac-
commodation to the rest of the federated States of the Union.
The Commission does not see this as an insurmountable barrier,
nor does this require the surrender of the Spanish language nor
the abandonment of a rich cultural heritage. Nevertheless, the
Commission expects that a decision for Statehood would denote
a desire of the Puerto Rican people to share as well as con-
tribute to the cultural heritage of the American people, to be an
integral part of the American Nation as well as a State in the
Federal Union.7 5
" H. S Truman, 1946 PUB. PAPERS 446 (1962).
" Bou, Significant Factors in the Development of Education in Puerto Rico, in SELECTED
BACKGROUND STUDIES, supra note 19, at 168.
n Hull, The English Problem, SAN JUAN REV. (June 1965).
7 Increased English Study Being Considered, San Juan Star, April 27, 1978, at 3.
7' STATUS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51.
" Id. at 15. Senator Henry Jackson specifically dissented on this point to underline the
language difference in relation to Statehood:
The people of Puerto Rico represent an old and rich culture. We welcome diver-
sity; therefore, the distinctive culture of Puerto Rico presents no bar as such to
Statehood. The unity of our Federal-State structure, however, requires a common
tongue. We do not have to look far to see what has happened in certain countries
that have failed to adhere to this fundamental practice. Surely, at a time when we
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Subsequent federal bilingual education legislation supported this
view."' The 1978 amendments to the Bilingual Education Acts in-
cluded a special provision with respect to children in Puerto
Rico. The 1974 Amendment permitted the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, like local governments in the continental United
States, to improve the English proficiency of children residing in
Puerto Rico. Following passage of the 1978 amendments, Puerto
Rico was permitted to address in Spanish the needs of students
with limited English proficiency.7
As Statehood has become more seriously considered, the speci-
fic language accommodations have focused upon official bodies as
well as educational institutions. The debate has centered upon the
use of Spanish in the federal district court, and the availability in
English of Puerto Rico Supreme Court opinions 79 and Puerto Rican
legislation.' The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that "the
means of expression of our people is Spanish,"81 despite the Puerto
Rican law providing that English and Spanish shall be used indis-
criminately.82 At present, this issue is far from resolved.
V. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMONWEALTH
At the initiative of the Popular Democratic Party in 1950, the
United States Congress passed Public Law 600,8 which authorized
the island to draft its own constitution, to be approved by the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico and by Congress. In addition, the law repealed
are trying to eliminate ghettos of all kinds, we should not establish within our
Federal-State system a 'language ghetto.' A condition precedent to Statehood
must be the recognition and acceptance of English as the official language. The
continuance of Spanish as a second language would not be inconsistent with this
requirement.
Id. at 224.
76 Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880(b)(1968), as amended by Bilingual Education
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 503, and by the Bilingual Education Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2268 (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3293 (Supp. II
1978)).
20 U.S.C. § 3241(c) (Supp. II 1978).
, See discussion at pp. 255-56 infra.
For many years Puerto Rico Supreme Court opinions were published in both Spanish
and English but for the last several years they have not been available in English.
' Puerto Rico is required by its own statutes to publish Puerto Rico legislation, reports,
and hearings in both Spanish and English. Under the pressure of limited financial and
human resources, English translations rarely are available.
" Puerto Rico v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 92 P.R.R. 580 (1965).
" P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, § 51 (1975).
Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, § 2, 64 Stat. 319 (current version at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731, 752,
774, 821 (1976)).
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portions of the Jones Act of 1917, and renamed the remainder the
Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act. During the course of approv-
ing the Constitution, which established the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico," violence broke out in Puerto Rico and in the United
States. From October 30 to November 6, 1950, twenty-eight per-
sons were killed and 419 wounded on various parts of the island.
On November 1, an attempt was made to assassinate President
Truman. If establishment of the Commonwealth was a com-
promise between Statehood and independence, it was not a com-
promise easily effected.
With the establishment of Commonwealth in the early 1950s,
Puerto Rico acquired the type of local governmental autonomy
associated with the States in the United States federal structure.
Presently, Puerto Rico has its own Constitution, pursuant to
which it elects the Governor and legislature; appoints judges,
cabinet officials, and lesser officials in the executive branch; sets
its own educational policies; determines its own budget; and
amends its own civil and criminal codes. Nonetheless, Com-
monwealth partisans argue that more than local self-government
was achieved by the 1950 legislation and that a legal entity was
created with a unique status in American law. It is asserted that a
Commonwealth, as an internationally recognized non-colonial
State, would limit federal authority and permit an international
presence. The Commonwealth, at its stage of maximum develop-
ment, is conceived as a "permanent union between the United
States and Puerto Rico on the basis of common citizenship, com-
mon defense, common currency, free market, and a common loyal-
ty to the value of democracy," with the federal government retain-
ing specifically defined powers "essential to the Union."' Most im-
portant, in this view, is that a Commonwealth is not a "territory"
covered by the "territorial clause" of the Constitution, neither
quite obviously is it a State. Rather, Commonwealth is sui generis
and its judicial bounds are determined by a "compact," which can-
not be changed without the consent of both Puerto Rico and the
United States."
" The word "commonwealth" is the official translation of "estado libre associado," which
translated literally means "free associated state." P.R. LAws ANN. vol. 1, res. 22 (1952). The
English translation was the subject of considerable debate in the Constitutional Conven-
tion, but the word "Commonwealth" was adopted with only two dissenting votes. Diario de
Sessiones de La Convencion Constitutyente de Puerto Rico 883 (1956).
15 P.R. LAWS ANN., vol. I, res. 1 (1962).
The compact argument is presented convincingly by the former Governor of Puerto
Rico, Hernandez Colon, in The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Territory or State? 19 REV.
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The preamble of Public Law 600 states that while "[f]ully
recognizing the principle of government by consent this Act is
now adopted in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto
Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of
their own adoption."8 The people of Puerto Rico approved the
law. Locally elected delegates drafted a constitution," which was
ratified in a special referendum by the people of Puerto Rico. It
was then submitted to Congress, which indicated its approval by
the passage of Public Law 447.P Subsequently, the United States
advised the United Nations that it would no longer report with
respect to Puerto Rico under article 73(e) of the United Nations
C. ABO. P.R. 207 (1959). See also The Power of the Congress to Enter into a Compact With
the People of Puerto Rico; and the Legal Status of the Compact under Existing Legislation
and Under S. 2023 and H.R. 5926, Hearing on S. 2023 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs; 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1959), in 22 REV. C. ABO. P.R. 341 (1962). The
subject has produced a number of articles: Puerto Rico: A Study in Democratic Develop-
ment, 285 ANNALS 1 (1953); Fliess, Puerto Rico's Political Status Under Its New Constitu-
tion, 5 W. POL. 0. 635 (1952); Garcia-Passalacqua, The Legality of the Associated Statehood
of Puerto Rico, 4 INTER-AM. L. REV. 287 (1962); Geigel-Polanco, La Ley de Relaciones
Federalis y el Estado Politico de Puerto Rico, 23 REV. C. ABO. P.R. 67 (1962); Lewis, El Pro-
blema del Status Politico, 22 REV. C. ABO. P.R. 523 (1962); Leibowitz, The Applicability of
Federal Law to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 GEO. L.J. 219 (1967); Leibowitz, The
Drift of the Commonwealth, 37 REV. DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 102 (1973); Magruder, The
Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1953); Munoz-Amato, Congres-
sional Conservatism and Puerto Rican Democracy in the Commonwealth Relationship, 21
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 321 (1952); Munoz-Marin, Puerto Rico and the U.S., Their Future
Together, 32 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 541 (1954); Morales-Yordan, The Constitutional and Interna-
tional Status of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 18 REV. C. ABO. P.R. 5 (1957); Nader,
The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 23 HARV. L. REV. 2 (1956); Silving, In the Nature
of a Compact, 20 REV. C. ABO. P.R. 159 (1960); Note, The Unique Status of Puerto Rico in
Relation to the Federal Government, 8 MERCER L. REV. 360 (1957). The federal government
has entered into compacts with States in certain areas. This development is related to the
problem discussed in the text although the constitutional questions involved are different.
See generally Grad, Federal State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-operative
Federalism, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 825 (1963).
" 48 U.S.C. § 731b (1976) (emphasis added).
" The care with which the Puerto Rican Constitution was drafted can be seen in
ESCUELA DE ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA, LA NUEVA CONSTITUCION DE PUERTO Rico (1954). The
debates are reported in P.R. Legislative Assembly, DIARIO DE SESIONES, PROCEDIMIENTOS Y
DEBATES DE LA CONVENCION CONSTITUYENTE, 1951-52, (4 vols. 1954). For an analysis of the
constitution, see Gutierrez, Franquil, & Wells, The Commonwealth Constitution, 285 AN-
NALS 33 (1953).
" Act of July 3, 1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327. Significantly, Public Law 447 refers twice to
Public Law 600 as a compact. It states in its preamble:
Whereas the Act entitled 'An act to provide for the organization of a constitu-
tional government by the people of Puerto Rico,' approved July 3, 1950, was
adopted by the Congress as a compact with the people of Puerto Rico, to become
operative upon its approval by the people of Puerto Rico ... (emphasis added).
The preamble further states "Public Law 600, Eighty-first Congress, adopted in the nature
of a compact .. " Id. (emphasis added).
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Charter, since Puerto Rico was now a self-governing territory. 1
One observer noted:
A most interesting feature of the new constitution is that it was
entered into in the nature of a compact between the American
and the Puerto Rican people. A compact, as you know, is far
stronger than a treaty. A compact usually cannot be denounced
by either party unless it has the permission of the other."
Thus, it is argued that the language of the statutes and subse-
quent executive actions indicate that a "compact" was intended.
In addition, the procedure set up by Public Law 600-a referen-
dum, the drafting of the Constitution, another referendum in
Puerto Rico, and subsequent approval by Congress-is similar to
the procedure followed when an obligation not unilaterally
revocable by the federal government is entered into by the
federal government with a territory, such as when territories
become States or, as in the case of the Philippines, become in-
dependent.
From the outset the non-Commonwealth parties in Puerto Rico,
See part VII infra. The United Nations Charter, article 73 provides:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the ad-
ministration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of
self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of
these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to
promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these ter-
ritories, and, to this end ... (e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for
information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional
considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature
relatingto economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which
they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters
XII and XIII apply.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 73(e).
11 Memorandum by the Government of the United States of America concerning the
Cessation of Transmission of Information under Article 73(e) of the Charter with Regard to
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 35/L.121, at 8 (1953). The
characterization of the status of Puerto Rico was as follows:
[Clongress has agreed that Puerto Rico shall have, under that Constitution,
freedom from control or interference by the Congress in respect of internal
government and administration, subject only to compliance with applicable provi-
sions of the Federal Constitution, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and the
acts of Congress authorizing and approving the Constitution, as may be inter-
preted by judicial decision. Those laws which directed or authorized interference
with matters of local government by the Federal Government have been re-
pealed.
Id.
SId. See United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 1741, 2 (Aug.
28, 1953).
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seeking either Statehood or independence as the final status,
questioned the concept of Commonwealth. They argued that
although Congress may delegate powers to a territorial govern-
ment, the broad powers granted to Congress under the Territorial
Clause of the Constitution and the implied powers of the national
government remain and may be exercised should the need arise.
Further, they cite the legislative history of Public Law 600 to
challenge the compact and Commonwealth concepts.
A. Legislative History of Public Law 600
The legislation passed in 1950 and 1952 was in three stages: (1)
passage by the United States Congress of Public Law 600; (2)
referendum in Puerto Rico on Public Law 600, the election of
delegates to a Constitutional Convention, the drafting of a con-
stitution, and the approval of the constitution by popular vote;
and (3) approval of the constitution by the United States Congress
in Public Law 447. For purposes of this analysis, the Congres-
sional history is treated as a whole and the Puerto Rican debates
as a separate part of the legislative history. Some conclusions
with respect to this history are then offered.
1. Discussion in the United States Congress
The primary supporters of the legislation, Governor Munoz-
Marin and Resident Commissioner Fernos Isern of Puerto Rico,
did not suggest that Congress was making an irrevocable decision
with respect to the status of Puerto Rico. 3 Instead, they implied
that Congress could change the law if a different status were
deemed preferable at a later date. Consider, for example, the
following statement by Isern:
As already pointed out, H.R. 7674 would not change the status
of the island of Puerto Rico relative to the United States. It
would not commit the United States for or against any specific
future form of political formula for the people of Puerto Rico. It
would not alter the powers of sovereignty acquired by the
United States over Puerto Rico under the terms of the Treaty of
Paris.'
The federal legislative history is discussed in Stein, Notes on the History of Puerto
Rico's Commonwealth Status. 30 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 33 (1961), and in Helfeld, Congressional
Intent and Attitude Toward Public Law 600 and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, 21 REV. Jun. U.P.R. 255 (1952). Their conclusions were that Congressional
power continues unchanged after Public Law 600.
"Puerto Rico Constitution. Hearings on H.R. 7674 and S. 3336 Before the House Comm.
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Governor Munoz-Marin made similar statements, including:
You know, of course, that if the people of Puerto Rico should go
crazy, Congress can always get around and legislate again. But I
am confident that the Puerto Ricans will not do that, and invite
congressional legislation that would take back something that
was given to the people of Puerto Rico as good United States
citizens."5
Similarly, the executive branch in its comments on the bill sug-
gested no change in Congressional power with respect to Puerto
Rico. The following observation was made by the Secretary of the
Interior:
It is important at the outset to avoid any misunderstanding as
to the nature and general scope of the proposed legislation. Let
me say that enactment of S. 3336 will in no way commit the Con-
gress to the enactment of statehood legislation for Puerto Rico
in the future. Nor will it in any way preclude a future deter-
mination by the Congress of Puerto Rico's ultimate political
status. The bill merely authorizes the people of Puerto Rico to
adopt their own constitution and to organize a local government
which, under the terms of S. 3336, would be required to be
republican in form and contain the fundamental civil guaranties
of a bill of rights. . . . The bill under consideration would not
change Puerto Rico's political, social, and economic relationship
to the United States.96
The following comment was included in both the House and the
Senate Committee Reports on the bill:
The bill under consideration would not change Puerto Rico's fun-
damental, political, social and economic relationship to the
United States.... This bill does not commit the Congress, either
expressly or by implication, to the enactment of statehood
legislation for Puerto Rico in the future. Nor will it in any way
preclude a future determination by the Congress of Puerto
Rico's ultimate political status.97
Proponents of the Bill suggested that Puerto Rico was gaining in-
creased self-government similar to home rule but that no new or
on Public Lands, 81st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 63 (1949-1950) (statement of A. Fernos-Isern).
'7 Id. at 33.
Id. at 163-64 (letter from Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman to Chairman
Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs) (emphasis added).
91 H.R. REP. No. 2275, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950); S. REP. No. 1779, 81st Cong. 2d Sess.
3 (1950).
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permanent change of status was effected by Public Law 600.98 The
Bill passed the Senate without a recorded dissent and passed the
House with only one dissenting vote. Representative Vito Marcan-
tonio, an ardent independence advocate, was the only con-
gressman who raised the question of whether Congress had the
power to grant the degree of self-government envisioned by
Public Law 600.
After the referendum in Puerto Rico on Public Law 600 and the
subsequent drafting and approval of the constitution by Puerto
Rico, Congress was called upon to approve the constitution.
Uncertainties as to the meaning of the new legislation and of the
establishment of the Commonwealth were raised in a dialogue be-
tween Senator Malone and Chairman O'Mahoney of the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Once again, the
ultimate authority of the Congress was affirmed. The Chairman
stated that:
So far as the Constitution of Puerto Rico adheres to the prin-
ciples of this law, law 600, of the Eighty-first Congress, and con-
cerns itself with local affairs, the Congress of the United States
in approving the constitution agrees that authority of the people
in their local affairs within the domain and within the scope of
Public Law 600 is complete and that Congress will not interfere,
but if the people of Puerto Rico should step outside, if an at-
tempt should be made to change the Constitution and deal with
these matters outside the scope of the grant, I think that the
authority of the Congress of the United States, under the Con-
stitution, could not be impaired or reduced. . .."
At one point, Representative Meader offered an amendment that
would have clarified the revocable nature of the act. The amend-
ment declared "[tihat nothing herein contained shall be construed
as an irrevocable delegation, transfer or release of the power of
the Congress granted by Article IV, section 3, of the Constitution
of the United States."'' In offering his amendment, Meader ex-
plained:
This seems to be the consensus of the legal opinion I was able to
assemble within the limited period I had; namely, that the ap-
" 96 CONG. REC. 9594 (1950).
" Id. at P93.
" Approving Puerto Rican Constitution" Hearings on S.J. Res. 151 before the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 48-49 (1952).
01 98 CONG. REC. 6183 (1952).
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proval of the Puerto Rican Constitution does not constitute an
irrevocable delegation of the authority of the Congress under ar-
ticle IV, section 3, of the United States Constitution. My amend-
ment simply and plainly says exactly that, and would eliminate
the doubt. If the prevailing legal opinion . .. is correct, I think
the amendment should be adopted. If that opinion is not correct
and we are doing something more, it seems to me that in
fairness to the people of Puerto Rico we ought to spell out clearly
the legal powers of this new governmental unit called a Com-
monwealth. '
The amendment was rejected,1"3 but it is not clear whether it was
opposed for technical reasons or because it was thought un-
necessary. No one, however, opposed it on the grounds that Con-
gress was making an irrevocable delegation of its constitutional
power over territories.
The constitution was approved by Congress conditioned upon
three changes. Congress demanded (1) deletion of a provision pat-
terned after the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights recognizing the right to work, the right to an adequate
standard of living, and social protection in old age or sickness; (2)
addition of a provision assuring continuation of private elemen-
tary schools; and (3) addition of a provision requiring that any
amendment to the constitution be consistent with the United
States Constitution, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, and
Public Law 600. This last amendment emasculated the original
Senate proposal for Congressional approval of any amendment to
the Puerto Rican Constitution.'" All three changes were made by
Puerto Rico and approved by the Puerto Rican Constitutional
Convention.t 05
2. The Debates in Puerto Rico
The Puerto Rican Constitutional Convention met from
September 17, 1951 through July 10, 1952.11 As in the United
States Congress, the two main issues around which the discussion
revolved were the effect of Public Law 600 on the status of Puerto
Rico, and the continued applicability to Puerto Rico of the Ter-
ritorial Clause of the United States Constitution.
102 Id.
10 Id. at 6186.
,04 Id. at 7924.
Res. 34, July 10, 1952.
Excerpts in this section are unofficial translations taken from the DIARIO DE SESSIONES
DE LA CONVENCION CONSTITUYENTES DE PUERTO Rico (1961 ed.) (4 vols.) [hereinafter cited as
DIARIOl.
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The Populares were silent as to the details of the juridical situa-
tion that would occur with the adoption of the Puerto Rican Con-
stitution. What was clear from their point of view was that a com-
pact had been entered into which would limit Congressional
power in a fashion similar to the way the Tenth Amendment
limits national power over a State of the Union.0 7 Governor
Munoz-Marin stated that:
It is undoubtedly so, nor should there be doubt, that all traces of
colonialism have disappeared in Puerto Rico because this is a
union by compact. It is a union on the basis of the principle of
mutual consent and there can be nothing which goes beyond the
validity of a compact freely agreed upon between peoples, nor
can there be anything greater than the free consent of a people
to a form of government and to a form of relation with another
people or with other peoples. It is in that sense, fellow-members
of the Constitutional Convention, that we have said that the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico have reached the highest possible level of
political equality, and of political dignity .... 0'
The problem concerning the effect of Public Law 600 arose in con-
nection with article VI, section 18 (originally section 10) of the
Puerto Rican Constitution, which repeated almost verbatim a por-
tion of section 10 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act. The
section states that criminal cases in the courts of the Com-
monwealth shall be conducted in the name and by the authority of
"The People of Puerto Rico," until otherwise provided by law.
If one assumed that the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act
could be changed only with the consent of Puerto Rico (that a com-
pact existed and that it included the Puerto Rican Federal Rela-
tions Act) there was no problem. If, however, the contrary was
assumed (that Congress could change the Puerto Rican Federal
Relations Act without the consent of Puerto Rico), the Com-
monwealth Constitutional provision could raise problems. 9 The
Puerto Rican Constitutional Convention participants were alert to
the implications of the provision as indicated in the following
statement:
07 Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act: Hearings on S. 2023 Before the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-64 (1959).
,0 Statement of Governor Munoz-Marin, 4 DIARIO, supra note 106, at 2470.
"0 Courts sympathetic to the "compact" notion have asserted the primacy of the Con-
stitutional provision over the Federal Relations Act in dicta but have avoided a direct
holding to that effect. See Moreno Rios v. United States. 256 F.2d 68 (lst Cir. 1958); and
RCA Communications v. Government of the Capitol, 91 P.R.R. 404 (1964).
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Mr. President, I ask that section 10 be eliminated because it is a
terrain forbidden to us. It is already a part of the Puerto Rican
Federal Relations Act. We cannot legislate concerning this,
much less repeat the same provisions contained in the Federal
Relations Act, without creating confusion and establishing a
dualism within our Constitution between the Federal Relations
Act and the Constitution which we adopt here. If the Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act already provides the same thing
provided in section 10, I do not see why there is a need to repeat
it. I believe it is unnecessary and I ask that it be eliminated. '
However, the section 10 Constitutional provision was retained,
despite its uncertain parameters.
Perhaps the most noteworthy difference in the two legislative
histories is the emphasis on citizenship. In the Puerto Rican Con-
stitutional Convention, citizenship was emphasized along with its
attendant powers. Consider, for example, the following statement:
It has been said that the Congress of the United States has
power even to sell Puerto Rico because, considering Puerto Rico
as a possession or a territory, it is legally qualified to get rid of
it as it wishes, by virtue of the provisions of Art. IV Sec. 3, Cl. 2
of the national Constitution, which has been known as the Ter-
ritorial Clause. I, as an American citizen . . .protest this state-
ment that places the Congress of the United States at a level
which it does not deserve, with a prestige it has not earned, with a
valuation of human rights that is not possible to be held by us
without offending the dignity of that Congress and of that peo-
ple. We are not animals, we are not a thing. We are American
citizens and the Congress of the United States, without
degrading the citizenship, could never sell Puerto Rico, nor take
action which would tend to go backwards in the progressive
development of its internal, and later international life, regard-
ing the solution of its political status."'
The United States Congress ignored the citizenship issue.
From the legislative history, it may be concluded that there was
an irrevocable grant of authority in local affairs with no delega-
tion of authority to resolve the ultimate status question. The mat-
ter is by no means clear, although many congressmen thought
they were doing just that."2 The following statements were made
during floor debate:
"' Statement of Mr. Iriarte, 3 DIARIO, supra note 106, at 2126.
.. Statement of Antonio Reyes Delgado, 2 DIARIO, supra note 106, at 440.
"' See text accompanying note 100 supra.
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Mr. Bartlett. No one need have any apprehensions about a grant
of undue powers under this act to the people of Puerto Rico. Con-
gress retains all essential powers set forth under our constitu-
tional system, and it will be Congress and Congress alone which
ultimately will determine the changes, if any, in the political
status of the island."3
Mr. Javits. This bill does restrict, and let us have that very
clear, the people of Puerto Rico to a constitution which is within
the limitations of the Organic Act for Puerto Rico. Their fun-
damental status is unchanged. They undoubtedly will get more
powers by a constitution under this act and they get them by
their own designation, but their fundamental status is unchang-
ed.1
1 4
A lengthy interchange between Representatives Meader and
Bentsen illuminates both the ambiguity of the legislative history
and the propriety of the interpretation of that history suggested
herein.
Mr. Meader. I am concerned about the legal status of this so-
called commonwealth once the Congress passes the resolution
before us. I am concerned whether or not the Congress thereby
will be making an irrevocable delegation of its authority under
article IV, section 3, clause 2 of our Constitution. Will it be
beyond the power of Congress to review any legislation adopted
under this constitution as it now can do? If the Congress passes
a law that is in conflict with a law adopted under this constitu-
tion by Puerto Rico, will the law passed by the United States
Congress supersede that of the Puerto Rican Legislature?
Mr. Bentsen. I think the gentleman has raised an excellent
point. I will try to answer it, if I may. To me it would do no more
in delegating away authority than we delegate away to a State,
and I think that is something that we should approach, although
we do not give them as complete autonomy as the State; that we
will still have every control over Puerto Rico that we have over
a State, and still they will not have reached full State status in
that they do not have full representation in Congress and in ad-
dition they must operate under the Federal Relations Act.
Mr. Meader. That is exactly what concerns me. I am more con-
cerned now than before because the answer the gentleman gave
would seem to be that the Congress, by passing this resolution,
would have made an irrevocable delegation of authority to Puer-
to Rico, similar to that granted when we admit a State into the
Union.
13 96 CONG. REC. 9595 (1950) (emphasis added).
'' Id. at 9585.
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Mr. Bentsen. Yes. In my interpretation I think we are doing
that.' 5
Representative Bentsen's reply is the strongest direct statement
that Congress was making an irrevocable delegation of its ter-
ritorial power. Its importance rests in the fact that it was not an
isolated opinion.
The view expressed in this article reconciles the Puerto Rican
and Congressional legislative histories, while permitting a limita-
tion on Congressional power in territories that have not acquired
Commonwealth status. The compact, as set forth by the PDP,
became the critical underpinning of the Commonwealth status. It
was a confirmation of the moral validity of the United
States-Puerto Rico relationship and basic to the concept of a
mutual relationship. It created an equality in fact and in law,
which would raise the Commonwealth, regardless of its precise
legal consequences, to a dignity not encompassed in a territorial
status. At a minimum, its implication was that henceforth status
evolution was a joint determination and not a unilateral decision
of the Congress. Even this minimal interpretation of the Com-
monwealth was questioned, although as a matter of political fact it
was only reflective of the actual circumstances. The change from
territory to Commonwealth was bilateral, requiring Puerto Rican
support. In fact, no action of major import had been taken by the
Congress since 1917 (the grant of citizenship) on any territory
without requiring a corresponding popular act of acquiescence by
the territorial legislature or by the territorial electorate directly.
Although the threat of unilateral Congressional action in status
matters may be deemed by Congress to be worthy of protection, it
appears to be of theoretical rather than practical value.
The official Commonwealth position is that the scope of the com-
pact embraces both the Puerto Rican Constitution and the Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act. The argument is that this was de-
fined in Public Law 600, which was accepted by the Puerto Rican
people. The compact may be considered a commitment not to
change Puerto Rico's status without mutual consent combined
with a grant of home rule,11 the boundaries of which are limited to
the matters covered by the Puerto Rican Constitution.
98 CONG. REC. 6170 (1952) (emphasis added).
" A recent district court case seems to have taken the same position. See United States
v. Ortiz Perez, 465 F. Supp. 1284, (D.P.R. 1979) (holding anti-wiretapping provisions of Puerto
Rico Constitution applicable in local courts but superseded by the Federal Omnibus Crime
Control Act).
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The United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of
Puerto Rico, Which was charged with studying "all factors ...
which may have a bearing on the present and future relationship
between the U.S. and Puerto Rico,"' confirmed the validity of
Commonwealth without determining the compact issue. Its report
concluded that:
[A]ll three forms of political status-the Commonwealth,
Statehood, and Independence-are vital and confer upon the
people of Puerto Rico equal dignity with equality of status and
of national citizenship .... All three status alternatives ... are
within the power of the people of Puerto Rico and Congress to
establish under the Constitution .... With respect to questions
raised on the subject of the compact, the Supreme Court of the
United States is, of course, the ultimate interpreter of the Con-
stitution and it has not declared itself on these questions. The
weight of legal scholarship sustains the innovative power of the
Federal Government to create a new form of associa-
tion-including a binding association-in accordance with the
desires of the people of Puerto Rico. It is clear that the Govern-
ment entered into a solemn agreement with the Puerto Rican
people in 1952 and that the agreement, referred to in the legisla-
tion as the compact, bears permanent legal consequences .... 118
The Status Commission's recommendation for a status referen-
dum on the three alternatives was followed. In 1967, the people of
Puerto Rico went to the polls and supported the status of Com-
monwealth. 1 9
Congressional practice has been to ignore the compact in rela-
tion to federal legislation, regardless of the impact on the Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act. Thus, Congress has changed the
jurisdiction of the United States District Court in Puerto Rico,
modified the increase on Puerto Rican indebtedness, and changed
a host of tax and tariff regulations without requiring or
acknowledging the need for Puerto Rican consent.
B. Judicial Commentary
The initial cases that examined the issue of compact arose in
local courts soon after the establishment of the Commonwealth
... Act of Feb. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-271, § 4, 78 Stat. 17, 18.
..' STATUS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51, at 5-13. But see views of Sen. Jackson, id.
at 21.
"' The returns showed 60.41% supported "perfected" Commonwealth and 38.98% sup-
ported Statehood. Independence partisans generally boycotted the election, although some
leaders did participate. The independence option received 0.6% of the vote. Puerto Rico
Vote Strongly Favors a Commonwealth, New York Times, July 24, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
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and were influenced by the contemporary desire to sustain the
validity of the Commonwealth. These decisions clearly establish
that Puerto Rico is no longer a territory but has gained, with its
Commonwealth status, a new dignity. However, the legal effect of-
this status has been difficult to determine.'
Recent Supreme Court decisions have followed a similar ap-
proach, initially with some hesitancy later with increased firmness.
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company,2' the first
Supreme Court case decided on the merits since the formation of
Commonwealth, the Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. attempted to pre-
vent application of a Puerto Rican forfeiture statute by arguing
that it was an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process of law. The Puerto Rican Federal District Court, con-
sisting of three judges,'22 agreed. An appeal was taken directly to
the Supreme Court of the United States under the terms of the
statute. Under the Three Judge Court Act, three judges are re-
quired to hear a case if the petitioner is requesting the federal
court not to enforce a State statute because it is unconstitutional.
At issue was whether Puerto Rican statutes were "State"
statutes requiring a three judge court to decide their constitu-
tionality. Earlier cases interpreting the law in Hawaii prior to
Statehood and in Puerto Rico prior to Commonwealth had held
that the word "State" did not include a territory. The Supreme
Court held that Commonwealth status had changed this situation
and that there was sufficient sovereignty and local control in the
Commonwealth to require a three-judge district court. The case
sustained the Commonwealth argument that something of legal
significance happened in 1950-52, but left open the issue of
whether Puerto Rico is covered by other federal statutes if
"State" is mentioned. The Court indicated that Public Law 600
"offered the people of Puerto Rico a Compact whereby they might
establish a government under their own constitution."'" Assum-
ing the Court was being cautious, it was indicating the existence
of a compact encompassed by the local constitution.
The case of Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero'24 clarified the Court's thinking. The
" Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 382 (1st Cir. 1953); Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 30M
(D.P.R. 1953). See also Colon-Rosich v. Puerto Rico, 256 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1958).
121 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See also Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
363 F. Supp. 1337 (D.P.R. 1973).
12 416 U.S. 663, at 671.
426 U.S. 572 (1976).
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case reaffirmed what had been hinted at; namely, that there was a
compact and its extent was to be found within the Puerto Rico
Constitution. Flores de Otero involved a challenge to a Puerto
Rican statute that restricted the licensing of civil engineers to
United States citizens. The Court reviewed, at considerable
length, the history of federal legislation with respect to Puerto
Rico. In discussing the 1950 legislation, it reaffirmed the compact
argument. The decision referred to the legislation as being offered
in the "nature of a compact" to "the people of Puerto Rico."' 5 It
noted the proposed constitution for Puerto Rico and specifically
discussed the Congressional approval of the document and its re-
quirement that any amendment or revision of the document be
consistent with the applicable provisions of the Constitution of the
United States. 16 Then, in critical language, the Court enunciated
the consequences of this arrangement: "The condition was ac-
cepted, the compact became effective, and Puerto Rico assumed
'Commonwealth' status. This resulted in the repeal of numerous
provisions of the Organic Act of 1917."'
Two points should be noted here. The compact is valid, although
its extent and significance is unclear. Further, Commonwealth is a
specific status different from a territory. To assure that the
language, "assumed Commonwealth status," was given its appro-
priate significance, the Court emphatically reaffirmed it later in
the opinion: "We readily concede that Puerto Rico occupies a rela-
tionship to the United States that has no parallel in our history. .. 18
The effect of this unparalleled relationship was unclear. In fact, the
decision attached no significance to the factors of Commonwealth
and compact. The Court followed traditional standards to declare
unconstitutional the local government statute and to uphold
jurisdiction in the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico.
The recent Supreme Court cases of Califano v. Torres" '
(upholding lower SSI payments to United States citizens residing
in Puerto Rico than to those residing in the States) and Torres v.
Puerto Rico'30 (declaring unconstitutional a Puerto Rico statute
"' Id. at 593.
126 Id.
" Id. at 593-94.
" Id. at 596.
2 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
"1 442 U.S. 465 (1979). The incorporated versus unincorporated territory distinction has
been implemented in a fashion similar to that of the state due process requirement. Mon-
talvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332 (1974), holding Puerto Rico's abortion statute unconstitu-
tional in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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permitting a search without probable cause of baggage entering
Puerto Rico) continued to pay obeisance to the Commonwealth
concept without according Puerto Rico any legal benefit as a
result. In Califano v. Torres, the concept of Commonwealth status,
"without parallel in our history," was used to dismiss the equal
protection argument.' l In Torres v. Puerto Rico, neither Com-
monwealth status nor geographical insularity was held to
distinguish Puerto Rico from a State. The Court stated:
Puerto Rico then asks us to recognize an "intermediate border"
between the Commonwealth and the rest of the United States.
In support of this proposal it points to its unique political status,
and to the fact that its borders as an island are in fact interna-
tional borders with respect to all countries except the United
States. Finally, Puerto Rico urges that because of the
seriousness of the problems created by an influx of weapons and
narcotics, it should have the same freedom to search persons
crossing its "intermediate border" as does the United States
with respect to incoming international travellers. . . .Puerto
Rico has no sovereign authority to prohibit entry into its ter-
ritory, as with all international ports of entry border and
customs control for Puerto Rico are conducted by federal of-
ficers. Congress has provided by statute that Puerto Rico must
accord to all citizens of the United States the privileges and im-
munities of its own residents .... In an event, Puerto Rico's law
enforcement needs are indistinguishable from those of many
states. Puerto Rico is not unique because it is an island....13
Another recent Supreme Court case discussed previously, Har-
ris v. Rosario," disregarded the establishment of the Com-
monwealth. Puerto Rico was not treated as a State but rather, as
in Califano v. Torres, as similar to a territory. Significantly, while
reaffirming Congressional power under the Territorial Clause, the
Court, for the first time, did not mention Commonwealth. Even
when mentioning Puerto Rico, the word Commonwealth was not
included. It is hoped that the Supreme Court was not intending a
new view of Commonwealth status.
The idea of a compact establishing a relationship different from
that of a territory was implemented and utilized in connection
with the negotiations for union put forth by the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands and negotiated by the Department of State. In
"' 435 U.S. at 3 n.4.
,12 442 U.S. at 472-74.
. 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
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that situation, the United States entered into a bilateral relation-
ship with the Northern Marianas, which, by its terms, required
mutual consent before certain of its provisions could be changed.
For the remainder of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a
Compact of Free Association was offered, which again was of bind-
ing character with respect to a number of its provisions.'"
Commonwealth partisans in Puerto Rico similarly have attemp-
ted to clarify the content of the relationship and its consequences
on specific federal laws. 13 The Ad Hoc Advisory Group for Puerto
Rico, composed of an equal number of Puerto Ricans and Stateside
representatives," drafted a proposed compact between Puerto
Rico and the United States."7 The proposed compact focused
1" See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America, 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976); Compact of Free
Association, available from the Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Micronesia
Status Negotiations (Eighth Round, May 28-June 2, 1976). The Compact was initialed by
representatives of the United States, Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia
on 31 Oct. 1980. The representative of the Palau Islands signed the Compact on 17 Nov.
1980.
1" In 1959, the Commonwealth introduced comprehensive legislation in both Houses of
Congress, S. 2023 and H.R. 5926, to clarify the Commonwealth role in the U.S. federal struc-
ture. After hearings on S. 2023 were held late in the Spring of 1959 by the Senate Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs, a substitute measure was introduced by Senator Mur-
ray, the Chairman of the Committee, and Dr. Fernos-Isern, the Resident Commissioner of
Puerto Rico. These later bills (S. 2708 and H.R. 9234) were modifications of the original
bills, having taken into consideration legislative and executive branch comment on the bills
as first introduced. Extensive hearings were held in Puerto Rico on these later bills, but
none were reported out of the Senate or House Committees. 105 CONG. REC. 1023, 1292
(1959). The Commonwealth proposed in the Fernos-Murray Bill that federal laws apply in
Puerto Rico (1) to the extent that they could be applied if Puerto Rico were a State, (2) "in-
sofar as they are consistent with this compact and are otherwise applicable," and (3) if they
specifically mention the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The latter version of the bill
modified this position. The requirement that federal law be consistent with the "compact"
was changed so that only the internal revenue and tariff laws were excluded from the
bounds of federal legislative authority. But most importantly, an interesting bifurcation
was made between legislation enacted pursuant to federal powers which apply to a State
and legislation enacted pursuant to "other powers" (the territorial clause). In the former
case, the legislation would apply without the requirement of legislative concurrence; in the
latter, Puerto Rican acceptance would be required. H.R. 5926, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. art. IX
(1959); H.R. 9234, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. art. IX(s) (1959).
18 The Ad Hoc Advisory Group for Puerto Rico was co-chaired by former Gov. Luis
Munoz-Marin and Sen. Marlow Cook.
" The proposed "Compact of Permanent Union Between Puerto Rico and the United
States," introduced in S.J. Res. 215, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 31786-88 (1976).
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Compact]. See also Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group for
Puerto Rico in I Proposed Compact of Permanent Union Between Puerto Rico and the
United States: Hearings on H.R. 11200 and H.R. 11201 Before the Subcomm. on Territorial
and Insular Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group].
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specifically on the ability of Puerto Rico to restrict the application
of federal law to assure the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico in areas
distinctly within its geographic confines, including the territorial
seas adjacent to Puerto Rico.1" It attempted to limit the federal
government's freedom of action with respect to Puerto Rico in a
number of areas, either by requiring consultation (international
trade, immigration into Puerto Rico, security and common
defense) 9 or by granting authority to the islands over matters
previously under federal control (control over ecology and en-
vironmental affairs).1 40 The proposed compact included a number
of statements suggesting that Puerto Rico had a role in the inter-
national community and constituted "an autonomous body organiz-
ed by their own free and sovereign will.''. International represen-
tation consistent with the functions of the United States as deter-
mined by the United States and the Governor of Puerto Rico was
to be permitted on a case-by-case basis. 42 The Supreme Court was
to be the final arbiter of matters justiciable under the compact.143
Furthermore, various restrictions on district court jurisdiction
were imposed, likening it to that of the island court.14
The proposed compact was introduced in the House of
Representatives1 45 and the Senate in 1975.146 Although hearings
were held in both Houses, the proposal went no further.47 Subse-
quently, President Ford, who had been silent as to the compact,
issued a statement favoring Statehood for Puerto Rico 4s and put
forth implementing legislation,'49 which suggested a receptivity
toward Statehood never before indicated at the White House
level. In 1978, the Carter Administration supported a new status
referendum in 1981 for Puerto Rico,"5 and Congress, for the first
1 Proposed Compact, supra note 137, at § 1.
' Id. §§ 6(f), 16, 4.
140 Id. § 13.
'' Id. § 1.
142 Id. § 2(c).
I, d. § 2(b)(4).
14 Id. § 15.
145 H.R. 11200, 11201, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 41487 (1975).
141 S.J. Res. 215, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 31785 (1976).
"47 Proposed Compact of Permanent Union Between Puerto Rico and the United States:
Hearings on S.J Res. 215 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1975-1976). Proposed Compact of Permanent Union Between Puerto
Rico and the United States: Hearings on H.R. 11200 and H.R. 11201 Before the Subcomm.
on Territorial and Insular Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Puerto Rican Compact Hearings].
,44 President's Statement on Proposed Statehood for Puerto Rico, 1976 PuB. PAPERS 2881.
',' H.R. 2201, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 1788 (1977).
150 President's Statement on the 26th Anniversary of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
1978 PUB. PAPERS 1336.
248 [Vol. 11:2
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO
time, indicated a willingness to abide by such a status referen-
dum, including the option of Statehood. 5'1 The judiciary began to
suggest a limitation on the unincorporated versus incorporated
territory distinction, which had been the basis of the Common-
wealth's flexibility. This limitation is indicated in the following
language:
Whatever the validity of the old cases, Downes v. Bidwell, Dorr
v. United States, and BaLzac v. Porto Rico, in the particular
historical context in which they were d'ecided, [they] are clearly
not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth
Amendment-or any other provision of the Bill of Rights-to
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the 1970's. As Mr. Justice
Black declared in Reid v. Covert: '[N]either the cases nor their
reasoning should be given any further expansion. The concept
that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections
against arbitrary government are inoperative when they
become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a
very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy
the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of
our Government." 2
It can be concluded that Commonwealth status and the compact
argument has gained some modest support in the various bran-
ches of the government. However, the long range impact and sup-
port within the federal government is largely dependent on
political attitudes in Puerto Rico. The end of the hegemony of the
Commonwealth Popular Democratic Party signalled an unclear di-
rection in Puerto Rico.
VI. THE APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL LAW
Commonwealth advocates have sought general exceptions to
federal law for the purposes of preserving the island's national
identity and limiting federal power. The Commonwealth's Pro-
posed Compact of 1975 would have required the specific mention
of the Free Associated State of Puerto Rico in any federal law
before it may be applied to Puerto Rico; further, the compact re-
quired, in case of an objection by the Governor or Resident Com-
missioner, a finding by Congress that the law in question was
"essential to the interests of the United States" and "compatible
H.R. Res. 2201, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. REC. 1 (1977).
,5 Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1979) (concurring opinion) (citations omit-
ted). See also King v. Morton, 520 F. 2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and Torres v. Delgado, 510 F.
2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1975).
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with the . . .compact."'" The Puerto Rican effort to obtain this
general exception reflected the lack of Congressional recognition
in practice of the Commonwealth or the compact. It also reflected
the lack of significance given to the local condition exception in
section 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act,M which
states that "[the] statutory laws of the United States not locally
applicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise pro-
vided, shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the
United States, except the internal revenue laws .... 15
This phrase, or its equivalent, has been in every initial Congres-
sional actM governing a territory, including the District of Colum-
bia, since the act establishing a government for the territory of
Wisconsin.157 The phrase, first applied to the Puerto Rican situa-
tion in the Foraker Act of 1900, was important because not all pro-
visions of the Constitution were made applicable to Puerto Rico."
Congress justified the omission by pointing to similar omissions in
previous territorial legislation.159 With respect to federal statutory
law, the section became relatively unimportant, as it was inter-
preted as referring only to statutes of general application in which
Puerto Rico was not mentioned specifically. One court stated that
"section 9 .. .has no application to acts expressly applicable to
District Courts of the United States. It only has reference to
general acts that are without special application, but are broad
Proposed Compact, supra note 137, at § 11(b).
48 U.S.C. § 731(e) (1976).
Id. § 734. The phrase "not locally applicable" is a grammarian's nightmare, but its in-
tent, that federal law applies unless local conditions are such that it should not apply, has
never been questioned (emphasis added).
" SENATE COMM. ON PACIFIC ISLANDS AND PUERTO Rico, TEMPORARY CIVIL GOVERNMENT
FOR PUERTO Rico, S. REP. No. 249, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1900).
' The Wisconsin Act's language was: "[T]he laws of the United States are hereby ex-
tended over, and shall be in force in, said Territory, so far as the same, or any provisions
thereof may be applicable." Act of Apr. 20, 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 15.
'" Compare the language in the Organic Act for the Territory of New Mexico: "[T]he
Constitution, and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have
the same force and effect within the said Territory of New Mexico as elsewhere within the
United States." Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 49, § 17, 9 Stat. 452.
I" See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 156, at 3-7. Dr. Jose Trias Monge, the Chief Justice of
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court and a leading expert in United States-Puerto Rican rela-
tions, is reported to have noted the desire of Congress by this section to extend federal law
to newly acquired territories where an absence of law exists. Since Puerto Rico had a Code
of Laws in 1900, he argued that its inclusion in the Foraker Act was unnecessary.
Rodriguez-Antongiorgi, Review of Federal Decisions on the Applicability of United States
Laws in Puerto Rico Subsequent to the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, 26 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 321 (1957).
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enough to apply to the possessions, and in their purport are prop-
erly applicable thereto." '
In any event, the section was applied infrequently because
courts divined legislative intent easily. Prior to Commonwealth
the word "possessions" or "territory" included Puerto Rico,
although the word "State" did not. The Elective Governor Act of
1947 attempted to render the exemption more meaningful by giv-
ing the executive branch power to apply the section 9 exception
where it was not specifically mentioned. 6' Thereafter, the Presi-
dent appointed a nine-person Advisory Commission on the Rela-
tion of Federal Laws to Puerto Rico,' composed of leading
lawyers and judges from the States and Puerto Rico. The Commis-
sion concluded that the situation did not require that the Presi-
dent exercise his power to exempt Puerto Rico from the terms of
a particular federal law, although it did call attention to three
specific federal laws-the Coastwise Shipping Laws, the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act-which in its view warranted further investigation. 3 Public
Law 600, as introduced, contained a provision permitting the
President, if local conditions warranted, to except Puerto Rico
from any federal law not expressly made applicable to it."8 But
Public Law 600, as finally passed, did not contain this Presidential
authority.
With the advent of Commonwealth, section 9 of the Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act gained importance, as it was
employed to question the applicability of federal law in a variety
of situations, even where Puerto Rico was mentioned specifically
in the statute or where the statute previously had applied to
Puerto Rico. The precursors of the section 9 exception were for-
mulated when communications were limited and Congress was
relatively uninformed as to the needs of frontier territories. The
"' Munoz v. Puerto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 83 F. 2d 262, 266 (1st Cir.), cerL
denied, 293 U.S. 689 (1936).
lot Act of Aug. 5, 1947, ch. 490, 61 Stat. 772 (repealed 1950). The law provided:
The President of the United States may, from time to time .... promulgate ex-
ecutive orders expressly excepting Puerto Rico from the application of any
Federal law, not expressly declared by Congress to be applicable to Puerto Rico,
which as contemplated by section 9 of this Act is inapplicable by reason of local
conditions....
Id. § 6(3).
" Exec. Order No. 10,P05, 3 C.F.R. 822 (1948).
"' Report of the Advisory Commission on the Relation of Federal Laws to Puerto Rico
(1949).
'5 S. 3336, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5, 96 CONG. REC. 8321 (1950).
1981]
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institutions in the territories were primitive and quite different
from those in the rest of the United States. Under the cir-
cumstances, territorial exceptions from federal legislation were
frequently necessary. Today, communications are much improved
and Congressional awareness of Puerto Rico's problems is more
acute. As a result, there has been very limited judicial exception
to federal law. Courts have expressed fear that cavalier applica-
tion of section 9 would result in "chaos." '65 The judiciary has failed
to apply a federal statute to Puerto Rico in only one case since
1952. 16
If the general exceptions to federal law have been infrequent,
special treatment under federal law has not been. Many issues
now arise in connection with this special treatment, both where
Puerto Rico alone has been treated specially and where it has
been joined by other non-State areas for special treatment.
Criteria for the Congressional special treatment are non-existent
and decisions have resulted from a series of special political or
economic circumstances. In view of the difficult situation, Con-
gress has considered a new Commission on the Applicability of
Federal Law to Insular Areas, which would include Hawaii, in ad-
dition to non-State areas.167
The special treatment of Puerto Rico is reviewed herein in the
context emphasized previously: cultural preservation and
economic and political participation.
Consentino v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 126 F. Supp. 420, 422 (D.P.R. 1954).
Acts that have been held to apply to Puerto Rico since the establishment of Commonwealth
include: the Taft-Hartley Act, United States v. Mejias, 131 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1955); the
Investment Company Act, Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Quing N. Wong, 252 F. Supp.
608 (D.P.R. 1966); Occupational Health and Safety Act, Carbitow Corp. v. Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Review Comm'n, 493 F.2d 1064 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974); Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act, Moreno Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 68, 71
(1st Cir. 1958); Smith Act, United States v. Mirabal Carrion, 140 F. Supp. 226 (D.P.R. 1956),
Arbona v. Kenton, 126 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Fair Labor Standards Act, Mitchell v.
Telephone Answering Service, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 607 (D.P.R. 1959), aff'd sub nom.,
Telephone Answering Service, Inc. v. Goldberg, 290 F.2d 529 (1st Cir. 1961), Mitchell v.
Rubio, 139 F. Supp. 379 (D.P.R. 1956); Marijuana Tax Act, Dario Sanchez v. United States,
256 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1958), Valpais v. United States, 289 F.2d 607 (1st Cir. 1961); Labor
Management Reporting Act, Hodgson v. Union de Empleados de Los Supermercados
Pueblos, 371 F. Supp. 56 (D.P.R. 1974); Sherman Act, Truxes v. Rolan Electric Corp., 314 F.
Supp. 752 (D.P.R. 1970); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Puerto Rico v. Alexander,
438 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1977).
" United States v. Rios, 140 F. Supp. 376 (D.P.R. 1956) (Federal Firearms Act).
The proposed inclusion of Hawaii indicates that geography as well as status are impor-
tant variables.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO Rico
A. Cultural Preservation
1. Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
All major institutions in Puerto Rico, both federal and local, ex-
perienced the strain and tension involved in the status debate and
Commonwealth development. The role of the federal court in
Puerto Rico has been challenged because historically it has been
treated differently from federal courts in the States and different-
ly from territorial courts within the United States experience."'
Central to the question was the fact that, at the time of United
States acquisition of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico had a functioning
legal system generally following Spanish, civil law enforced
through a local court system conducted in Spanish. The United
States, in addition to attempting to impose the English language
upon the populace, introduced a number of federal laws and, even-
tually, the Anglo-American common law."9
To enforce these new laws the Federal District Court of Puerto
Rico was established. Not surprisingly, it was required to conduct
proceedings in English. To Puerto Rico politicians at the time and
to many modern scholars, establishment of the federal district
court was an imposition of United States law and cultural
values."' Although Puerto Rican politicians urged the court's
abolition at the outset, its jurisdiction was extended and the selec-
tion of judges changed from election to appointment, arguably to
meet the perceived needs of Stateside contractors in Puerto Rico.
Such developments reinforced the island's hostility to the court's
"' Territorial courts were viewed by Justice Marshall as legislative extensions whose
jurisdiction in relation to federal law was very limited and, perhaps, non-existent. Sere v.
Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810). See J. EBLEN, THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED STATES
EMPIRES: GOVERNORS AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT 1784-1912, at 92 (1968). The federal
district court in Puerto Rico had a special diversity jurisdiction designed to expand its
powers and remove certain cases from the local courts. See Amadeo-Murga, Distribution of
Power Between Federal and Local Courts and the Rise of Federalism in the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, 20 REV. C. Aso. P.R. 29 (1959). See also Beresford, Com-
monwealth Status and the Federal District Court of Puerto Rico, 19 REV. C. ABO. P.R. 19
(1958); and Clark & Rogers, The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court
Reorganization, 61 YALE L.J. 1147 (1952).
10 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO REVISE AND COMPILE THE LAWS OF PUERTO RICO (1901).
This commission was created in the Foraker Act, ch. 191, § 40, 31 Stat. 86 (1900).
'70 The leading legal historian in Puerto Rico has expressed the view that the establish-
ment of the federal district court and the Puerto Rican law schools were key acts of cultural
imperialism. See Delgado Cintron, El Tribunal Federal como Factor de Transculturacion
en Puerto Rico, 3 REV. DE DERECHO HUMANOS 112 (1973) and Delgado Cintron, Las Escuelas
de Derecho de Puerto Rico 1790-1916, 41 REV. JUR. DE U.P.R. 7 (1972). See also G. DE
GRANDA GUTIERREZ. supra note 21.
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presence.17 Currently, jurisdiction and status of the United States
District Court in San Juan is similar to federal district courts on
the mainland.172 Appeals from this court are akin to those of any
other district court, ie., to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit and then by certiorari or appeal to the Supreme
Court. Appeals from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, like those
from the highest State courts, are to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In other respects, the United States judiciary and Congress
have been sensitive to local autonomy. There are modest distinc-
tions, for example, in connection with jurisdiction, favorable to
local autonomy. No suit restraining the assessment or collection of
a tax imposed under the laws of Puerto Rico may be maintained in
a federal court, although in a comparable situation in the States
the enjoining of a State tax is barred only if there is a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy in the State court."' Similarly,
although the Supreme Court has the power to formulate criminal
rules for all federal trial and appellate courts, and for the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,"' in the exercise of its discretion,
the United States Supreme Court has never applied the power to
the Puerto Rican Supreme Court. 7'
Sensitivity to local autonomy is best seen in the evolution of
federal court deference to local court construction of local law.",
This deference was applied to Puerto Rico in 1914 in strong
terms.' Nonetheless, the First Circuit continued to reverse the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in a large number of cases on the
" Delgado Cintron, El Tribunal Federal como Factor de Transculturacion en Puerto
Rico, supra note 170, at 123-25.
,"I Miranda v. United States, 255 F. 2d 9 (1st Cir. 1958); see also Americana of Puerto
Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 240 F. Supp. 854 (D.N.J. 1965); and Beresford, Commonwealth Status
and the Federal District Court of Puerto Rico, supra note 168.
173 28 U.S.C. § 1258 (1976).
'u Compare 48 U.S.C. § 872 (1976) with 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
6 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1976).
176 FED. R. CRIM. P. 54; see Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201 (1938).
'" The principle was first enunciated in Sweeney v. Lomme, 89 U.S. (22 Wall) 208, 213
(1874).
178 Nadal v. May, 233 U.S. 447 (1914). See also Crowley v. United States, 194 U.S. 461
(1904). The most recent exercise of this principle arose out of the hotly contested 1980 Puerto
Rican elections. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court upheld the PDP contentions. The federal
district court intervened supporting the PNP, but was reversed by the court of appeals.
Partido Nuevo Progesista v. Barreto Perez, (1st Cir. 1980), rev'g PNP v. Perez, (Civ. No.
80-2420 D.P.R. Dec. 24, 1980), cert. denied, 2853 U.S.L.W. (No. 80-1540, May 19, 1981). The
Puerto Rican Supreme Court case was reported as Popular Democratic -Party v. State Elec-
tion Commission (No. 0-80-646, 108 D.P.R.).
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basis of a different interpretation of local law.'79 As a result, in
1940, in Bonet v. Texas Co. of Puerto Rico, Inc.,'" Justice Douglas
stated the rule even more strongly:
For over sixty years this Court has consistently recognized the
deference due interpretations of local law by such local courts
unless they appeared to be clearly wrong.... We now repeat
once more that admonition.... To reverse a judgment of a Puerto
Rican tribunal on such a local matter as the interpretation of an
act of the local legislature, it would not be sufficient if we or the
Circuit Court of Appeals merely disagreed with that interpreta-
tion .... For to justify reversal in such cases, the error must be
inescapably wrong; the decision must be patently erroneous.18'
Chief Judge Calvin Magruder of the First Circuit subsequently
suggested a graceful departure from this type of review. He con-
tended that Congress, in approving the Commonwealth constitu-
tion, impliedly withdrew federal court jurisdiction over local ques-
tions."l 2
The greatest source of dispute over the role of the federal
district court is the requirement that its proceedings and judicial
process be conducted in English. The language requirement was
first imposed in the Foraker Act of 1900111 and is now viewed as a
vestige of the explicit attempt to Americanize the island.' Within
the status politics of the island, the issue has a high degree of
symbolic significance.' 5 Both Statehood advocates and Com-
monwealth partisans have argued for the elimination of the re-
quirement, although federal judges in Puerto Rico and the United
States have resisted.'" The Court Interpreters Act of 1978 provid-
'" Prior to 1964, the First Circuit reviewed opinions of the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico. Following the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1258 (1966), the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico, like those of any State supreme court, are reviewable only by the
United States Supreme Court.
ISO 308 U.S. 463 (1940).
1 Id. at 470-71 (emphasis added).
162 Marquez v. Aviles, 252 F. 2d 715 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 952 (1958).
1 48 U.S.C. § 864 (1976). In 1959, the Fernos-Murray Bill suggested optional use of
Spanish. H.R. 5926, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). See generally A. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 24.
"' See generally G. DE GRANDA GUTIERREZ, supra note 21; Delgado Cintron, Las Escuelas
de D.erecho de Puerto Rico 1790-1916, 41 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 7 (1972); Martinez, Idioma y
Derecho en Puerto Rico, 20 REV. C. ABo. P.R. 183 (1960); Torres, The Puerto Rico Penal
Code of 1902-1975: A Case Study of American Legal Imperialism, 45 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1
(1976).
' Delgado Cintron, El Tribunal Federal como Factor de Transculturacion en Puerto
Rico, supra note 170.
" Turner, Corrada Again Tries to Bring Spanish to Federal Courts, San Juan Star, Mar.
16, 1979, at 6.
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ed for bilingual interpreters where a party or witness "speaks on-
ly or primarily a language other than the English language."
1 87
This broad statute, applying throughout the United States, meets
the Puerto Rican need in part, although it did not permit, as Puer-
to Rico had urged,'" the filing of pleadings in either language or
the conduct of the trial in Spanish unless the court decided that it
would be more convenient in a particular case to require
English.'" In 1980, the House acquiesced to Puerto Rican wishes
and agreed to the use of Spanish in specific cases.'" However, the
Senate required the use of English exclusively if Puerto Rico's
status were changed to Statehood. 9 ' In recent years, the Puerto
Rican legal community, particularly its Commonwealth and in-
dependence partisans, have supported the development of a Puer-
to Rican legal system emphasizing the Spanish heritage.'" The
role of the federal district court, therefore, is likely to be a contin-
uing issue.
2. International Personality of the Commonwealth
Commonwealth supporters have continuously sought an inter-
national presence for Puerto Rico in order to obtain international
and United States recognition of their status, a broader forum for
their views, and as a means to emphasize the island's distinctive
character. 19
Commonwealth advocates have pressed for participation by
Puerto Rico in the United Nations associated agencies such as the
Economic Commission on Latin America; regional organizations
such as the Caribbean Development Bank; and industrial con-
28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
19 Resident Commissioner Benitez introduced a separate section with respect to the
district court on the island, which failed to be reported out of the Committee. H.R. 10129,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
1' See Proposed Compact, supra note 137, at § 15(b). The requirement of an English
speaking jury in the federal court has also been challenged without success. Pala, Suit on
English Requisite for Jurors Dismissed, San Juan Star, Mar. 17, 1979, at 3.
H.R. 5563, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H2409-2417 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1980).
191 See part IV, § B supra.
19 TRIAS MONGE, EL SISTEMA JUDICIAL DE PUERTO Rico (1978); see generally Garcia-Cruz
v. El Mundo (0-78-210) (P.R. 1979) (Rigau, concurring).
"9 Despite the ban of article 1, section 10, States have been permitted to enter into com-
pacts with other States and foreign governments without Congressional consent. Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893). See also McHenry County v. Brady, 37 N.D. 59, 163
N.W. 540 (1917). Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution" A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 749 (1925), lists eleven interstate agreements
made without Congressional consent, some expressly approved by the Supreme Court.
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ferences on trade. Scholars and advocates,'" citing cases 95 except-
ing Puerto Rico and the Philippines from the compact clause of
the Constitution1" have noted the possibilities of an international
role both under United Nations practice and United States Con-
stitutional doctrine. A number of Associated States have been
permitted, and even encouraged, to join various United Nations
international organizations such as the ILO and the Economic and
Social Commission on Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Never-
theless, there has been consistent resistance in the executive
branch, particularly in the State Department, on various grounds
that for the purposes of the compact clause Puerto Rico should be
considered a State. The following typifies this viewpoint: "[It is]
easy to imagine the anarchy that would result within the Federal
system if states were allowed to contract external ties without the
consent or supervision of the Federal government. There is no
reason why Puerto Rico or any state should be exempt from this
consideration.""' The Philippines precedent is dismissed on the
ground that Commonwealth in that instance was a transition to in-
dependence.
The long-term Puerto Rican interest in the Caribbean was ac-
commodated to some degree by permitting Puerto Rican member-
ship in the Caribbean Development Bank. The procedure adopted
for such permission was a lengthy one, including special Congres-
sional action and a requirement that the President transmit to the
Caribbean Development Bank an instrument stating that Puerto
Rico has the authority to conclude an agreement of accession.
Nonetheless, the language requires approval of any agreement by
the United States Secretary of State.9 ' The Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank has not as yet permitted Puerto Rico membership.
Perhaps, the refusal is based on Puerto Rico's nonindependent
role, although cultural and racial differences may be factors as
well.
I" M. REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS (1975). See also P.
LACOVARA, MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO
Rico UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO JOIN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND TO ENTER
INTO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (1975).
I" Hooven & Allison Co., v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945); and Dooley v. United States, 183
U.S. 151 (1901).
IN U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
"9 Camaur, The Feasibility of an Identifiable Role for Puerto Rico in Foreign Affairs, 42
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 814 (1974).
'" Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 52, 88 Stat. 1818 (1974).
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B. Economic and Political Participation
1. Economic Participation
Of all United States off-shore, non-State areas, Puerto Rico has
taken the largest economic strides since World War II. The
dimensions of the Puerto Rican economic "miracle" are indicated
by the statistics on aggregate income. Between 1947 and 1974,
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from $500 million to nearly
eight billion dollars, or at a compounded rate of slightly over ten
percent per year. Even with an adjustment for inflation, real GDP
increased at a rate of seven percent per annum, or at a real per
capita trend rate of about five percent per year. By any standards
of international comparison, such an achievement is spectacular.
Despite tremendous improvements in the standard of living,
however, economic problems remain. Most disturbing is the
island's continuing high unemployment rate. The rate consistently
has been about ten percent despite considerable migration of
Puerto Rican workers to the United States mainland. During the
recession period from 1973-1976, unemployment soared to over
twenty percent.
A key to Puerto Rico's development is the special relationship
of the island to the mainland. In many critical areas, the
possibilities for development are both limited and enhanced by
the relationship. Within Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth status
has been rationalized in large measure on the basis of economic
benefit; to wit, the series of federal laws extending special treat-
ment to Puerto Rico. ' " This "fiscal autonomy" embraces the tax
exemption, the exception to the full-scale application of the United
States minimum wage laws, and Puerto Rico's position within the
common market of the United States. This combination, which
formed the key economic framework for the industrialization of
Puerto Rico from 1944 to 1968, is still present, but increasingly is
subject to official questioning and reconsideration.'
'" But see Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Out of the Colonial Closet, 33 FOREIGN POL'Y 66
(Winter 1978-79), which points out that these key economic elements predated Com-
monwealth. He argues that Commonwealth did not cause the economic miracle but was its
benefactor. Id. at 81.
' Dennis & Rafuse, Tax Exemption and Its Alternative: Investment Incentives in the
Development Program of Puerto Rico (Report prepared for the Government Development
Bank of Puerto Rico (1976)); see also L. THUROW, PUERTO Rico's INDUSTRIALIZATION INCEN-
TIVES FOR THE 1970S AND 1980s (1970); Committee to Study Puerto Rico's Finances (Prof. J.
Tobin, Chairman), Report to the Governor (1975). Since it took office in 1977, the New Party
has supported the phasing out of the minimum wage exception as well as changes in the
Puerto Rican tax exemption.
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a. Exemption from the Internal Revenue Laws
Puerto Rico's tax status has been a key federal benefit. Since
1900, Puerto Rico has been treated specially for the purposes of
United States taxation. Section 14 of the Foraker Act of 1900,
which except for its last phrase is also section 9 of the Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act, provides as follows:
That the statutory laws of the United States not locally inap-
plicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise pro-
vided, shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in
the United States, except the internal revenue laws, which, in
view of the provisions of section three, shall not have force and
effect in Puerto Rico.I
The section 3 reference related to the provision that Puerto Rican
manufactured goods entering the United States would incur
duties and tax equal to the internal revenue tax imposed on
similar articles in the United States. The funds so collected would
be returned to the Puerto Rican Treasury.' A provision
equivalent to section 3 is included in the current Internal Revenue
Code."' The original purpose of the exception to the internal
revenue laws was to protect United States manufacturers against
Puerto Rican manufactured items, as well as to finance Puerto
Rican government expenditures." Furthermore, the exception
arose prior to the income tax, when the internal revenue laws en-
compassed only various excise taxes's and a special wartime
2' Ch. 191, § 14, 31 Stat. 80 (1900) (emphasis added).
Exactly what is to be returned to Puerto Rico has been the subject of recent litigation.
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands brought action against the United States seeking the
return of gasoline revenues retained by the United States which were derived from a tax of
$.04 per gallon imposed by the United States on initial sale of gasoline in the United States
by a producer or importer. The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that
the statute covered "equalization" taxes and that the gasoline tax was not an equalization
tax since it was a tax on "sale" not "manufacture." Puerto Rico v. Blumenthal, 642 F.2d 622
(D.C. Cir., Oct. 17, 1980), rev'g No. 75-1035, (D.D.C., Oct. 10, 1978), cert denied, 101 S.Ct.
2315 (1981). The reasoning of the appellate court is, as the court itself explicitly admitted,
extremely complex and driven, and appears at times, to be goal-oriented rather than confined
to an analytical examination. Thus, the court (1) extends the reach of the statute to absurd
lengths to find "ambiguity"; (2) gives considerable weight to the administrative interpreta-
tion by the party in interest and; (3) focuses on form rather than substance to distinguish
between excise taxes on liquor and the tax on gasoline.
' I.R.C. § 7652(a).
' Expectations were that tariffs would generate $2,000,000 and internal revenue taxes
approximately $1,000,000. S. REP. No. 240, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1900).
1 Between 1868 and 1913, excise taxes on liquor and tobacco accounted for approximate-
ly 90% of total revenue collections. S. SURREY & W. WARREN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4 (1960).
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levy.' The section granting the exception, however, has been car-
ried forward and reenacted with minor changes in succeeding
years, although there were no longer any duties levied on Puerto
Rican goods entering the States and the internal revenue laws in-
cluded the income tax.
In 1921, the federal income tax laws were amended to treat
possession income specially by deferring any tax on income from
such sources until that income was received in the States. 7 This
amendment arose partly as a result of the general desire not to
tax foreign source income in order to enable domestic companies
to compete more readily abroadm and partly because of the
refusal of a number of domestic companies doing business in the
Philippines to pay taxes to the United States government after
having paid taxes to the government of the Philippines.' Begin-
ning in 1948, Puerto Rico coupled this federal tax benefit with its
own tax exemption program, Operation Bootstrap, in order to at-
tract new industries to the island.1
In recent years, the federal government and Puerto Rico have
made major changes in the tax treatment of corporations doing
business in Puerto Rico, although the general principle of tax
benefit as a result of doing business on the island has remained.
The Federal Tax Reform Act of 1976 replaced Internal Revenue
Code section 931 with a new section 936 which, instead of ex-
cluding Puerto Rican source income for tax purposes, provides an
automatic tax credit on island income.21' Because dividends
distributed to United States parent companies are less subject to
tax under section 936 than under section 931, Puerto Rico passed
its own tollgate tax levying a ten percent tax on dividends paid by
The gross receipts tax lasted from 1898 until 1902. Id. at 8.
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 260, 262, 42 Stat. 227 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 932,933). It
should be noted that, in 1954, section 260 was amended so that the "section shall have no
application in the case of a citizen of Puerto Rico." I.R.C. § 932.
See H.R. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong. 1st Sess. 14-15 (1921); 61 CONG. REC. 7002-03 (1921)
(remarks of Sen. Broussard); 61 CONG. REC. 7023 (1921) (remarks of Sen. McCumber).
m See 61 CONG. REC. 5874-75, 5884-85 (1921) (remarks of Sen. Snoot); 61 CONG. REC. 649
(1921) (remarks of Sen. Townsend); 61 CONG. REC. 6998 (1921) (remarks of Sen. McCumber).
" The tax exemption program originated with the Industrial Tax Exemption Act of
1948, No. 184, Laws of P.R. 482 (expired 1962). It has been amended extensively by the In-
dustrial Incentives Act of 1954, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, §§ 241-51 (1978), and the Puerto
Rico Industrial Incentive Act of 1963, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 252 (j) (1978).
. I.R.C. § 936. A comparison of the statutory provisions under section 931 and section
936 is found in DEP'T OF COMMERCE, II ECONOMIC STUDY OF PUERTO Rico 76 (Dec. 1979). See
also The Operation and Affect of the Possessions' Corporation System of Taxation, in
[1979] DEP'T TREAS. SECOND ANN. REP.
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Puerto Rican derived earnings.2 ' The section 936 program, as it
now stands, still permits Puerto Rico to attract United States-
based private industry to the island on the basis of tax incentives.
What section 936 indicates, however, is the threat of major
changes, including the removal of the tax exemption at federal in-
itiative, contrary to Puerto Rican wishes." 3 In 1978, Puerto Rico
amended its own tax laws to provide a substantial, rather than
total, exemption, a modest employment incentive, and a tax con-
version system designed to encourage change from the "pre-
existing" to the "new" incentives program." 4 Nonetheless, assum-
ing that the taxpayer will derive income from Puerto Rico, the in-
teraction of federal and Puerto Rican tax laws still provides
substantial tax benefits.
To recapitulate, the taxation exemption was established
unilaterally by the Congress as an administrative convenience and
in response to Stateside constituent pressures. Until 1940, it was
not particularly significant, although its retention is currently an
integral part of Puerto Rican policy because of its use as an in-
dustrial incentive. Even Statehood advocates envision its contin-
uance for a considerable period of time."1 5 However, the structure
of the exemption is unusual. There are many technical decisions
such as when intercorporate transfers are taxable, which fre-
quently are determined by the Internal Revenue Service in rela-
tion to areas quite removed from Puerto Rico. Furthermore, the
precise benefits of the exemption vary considerably depending
upon the total tax and the interpretation of a number of economic
transactions."6
The tax structure is also contrary to the principle of United
. Act No. 95 (H.B. 1970, amending the Industrial Incentive Act of 1963, P. R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 13, § 252d (1978)) and Act No. 96 (H.B. 1971, amending the Income Tax Act, P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 144, 231(a)(i)(A)(1978)) took effect upon enactment of section 1051 of the Tax
Reform Act by the United States Congress. For further discussion of the tollgate tax, see
Mihaly, Puerto Rico: Repatriation of Puerto Rican Earnings, Dec. 1976 TAX MANAGEMENT
INT'L J. 3; and Nicot Santana, The New Puerto Rican "Toll Tax"- The Government's View,
Oct. 1976 TAX MANAGEMENT INT'L J. 3.
11 [1978] DEP'T TREAS. ANN. REP. 12.
214 CRB Signature Ends ERA, San Juan Star, at 1, col. 1; see also PUERTO Rico ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARY OF THE NEW INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVES PROGRAM
(1978).
215 Governor Romero-Barcelo has stated that even after Statehood he would expect Puer-
to Rico to have some special tax treatment for approximately 20 years. Romero-Barcelo,
Puerto Rico, USA: The Case for Statehood, 59 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 60 (Fall 1980).
218 J. HELLERSTEIN, THE UNITARY BUSINESS PRINCIPLE AND MULTICORPORATE ENTERPRISES
TAX EXECUTIVE 313 (1975); Note, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under
Section 482 of TUC Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1975).
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States citizenship. For the purpose of taxation, a Puerto Rican is
treated as an alien and the Puerto Rican geographic area as
foreign ground. This, of course, is consistent with the United
States attitude toward economic participation by Puerto Rican
citizens, but quite inconsistent with the grant of citizenship itself.
A preferable analysis of the Puerto Rican tax exemption is to
view it as an industrial incentive to a particular area. Structurally,
the exemption should be conceived as separate from source in-
come rules based on investment in foreign areas. The fact is that
Puerto Rico is not alien ground and its citizens are not aliens.
Although it may be bureaucratically convenient to treat Puerto
Rico in this fashion within the Internal Revenue Code, the result
is to torture the island's political character even further.
The discriminatory treatment of Puerto Rican citizens and
Puerto Rico under various federal programs elevates the tax ex-
emption issue to one of major debate in the federal government.
In many quarters, including the Supreme Court,1 the rationale
for the unequal treatment has been the fact that Puerto Rico does
not pay taxes. Although the question of economic participation as
a requisite of United States citizenship has not been. the position
of the Supreme Court, it seems that if citizenship status is to be
meaningful, it must involve equal treatment with United States
citizens where individual entitlement programs are involved. The
test in these programs is not contribution but need and, in
general, those who have contributed least financially receive, or
should receive, the larger benefits. Tax payment is simply irrele-
vant. Participation should be, like conscription, part of the
benefits or obligations of citizenship.
The general issue of Puerto Rico's contribution to the federal
treasury arose in connection with the proposed compact. It was
suggested by Munoz-Marin that a contribution by Puerto Rico as a
corporate entity, rather than a payment of taxes by individual
citizens of Puerto Rico, is preferable. He stated:
[S]ince residents of Puerto Rico pay no taxes, except marginally,
into the Federal general fund, this is a lack that must be cor-
rected. I have been reminding my people since the founding of
the Commonwealth that this fact must at some time be faced. I
had thought that the new Compact would give the opportunity
for instrumenting this by an agreed-to formula for initiating and
increasing payments from Puerto Rico to the United States
17 Califano v. Torres. 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
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through appropriations by the Legislature of Puerto Rico in the
exercise of its traditional and well-rooted fiscal autonomy. I
regret that the United States side of the Ad Hoc Committee ex-
pressed doubts about the general proposal. I appreciate the
nature of those doubts: the United States taxes citizens, it does
not exact tribute from bodies-politic. But if it taxed Puerto
Ricans in Puerto Rico without voting representation in the tax-
legislating body, it would not only be violating a basic principle
of the American Revolution, but would be destroying Puerto
Rico's fiscal autonomy, without which progress already achieved
would not have happened, could now be destroyed, and future
development would be tragically thwarted."1 8
The conclusion Munoz-Marin reached was to establish a special
fund, which would make payments to the United States as a func-
tion of the federal grants Puerto Rico receives.
However, others had equally strong beliefs on the issue of
taxes. Various congressmen believed that because citizenship is
individual, taxation should also be on an individual basis. Thus,
Senator Buckley, in a separate statement on the proposed com-
pact, stated:
I do not believe that the non-taxpaying residents of a largely
autonomous Puerto Rico should have an automatic right to
share on an equal basis in all the benefits to which the tax-
paying residents of the fifty states may be entitled by virtue of
programs enacted by the representatives elected from the fifty
states to the Congress. I doubt the permanency of any relation-
ship in which Puerto Rico is spared the burdens of participation
in the larger American enterprise while remaining entitled to
its benefits. 19
The point in time when Puerto Rico should pay and the method of
making the payment are two issues that need to be addressed.
The poverty of Puerto Rico has resulted in Puerto Rican officials
suggesting delay in payment until Puerto Rico's per capita income
is equal to, or some percentage of, the poorest State of the Union.
This is appropriate only if "corporate entity" rather than in-
dividual payments are envisioned. The approach should be taxa-
tion on individuals; payments made by United States citizens in
Puerto Rico on their individual income. Corporations attracted by
the industrial incentive could, perhaps, be treated differently.
218 Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group, supra note 137, at 54.
21' Separate views of Sen. James L. Buckley, in Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group,
supra note 137, at 59.
2631981]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 11:2
b. The Fair Labor Standards Act
Other aspects of the economic regulatory formula bear little
relationship to status goals, but result from legislative pressures,
economic need, or historical accident. Both Commonwealth and
Statehood partisans adopted positions for equal treatment with
States or for unique treatment based on economic advantage.
Both Commonwealth and Statehood partisans desire to be treated
equally with States in federal grant-in-aid programs, and want
special trade and energy treatment.m
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),1' which sets minimum
wages, formerly contained special provisions' permitting some
employers in Puerto Rico to pay less than the minimum wage. As
a result, average hourly earnings in manufacturing in Puerto Rico
for 1975 were $2.65 an hour, only fifty-six percent of the mainland
figure.' When the FLSA was enacted in 1938,11 it was fully ap-
plicable to Puerto Rico. 5 Since the minimum wage established by
that law (twenty-five cents an hour with phased increases to thirty
and forty cents an hour within seven years) generally was below
the prevailing wages in the United States, the effect on the
2w The selection of topics discussed in the text is arbitrary. Others topics of importance
on which Commonwealth and Statehood advocates agree are: the desire to be removed
from the Coastwise Shipping laws, environmental regulations, and extension of Puerto
Rican boundaries under the Submerged Lands Act. Environmental protection and maritime
regulation are subject to federal decisionmaking without Puerto Rican input. Nevertheless,
Puerto Rico frequently has been granted special exceptions and benefits. The issue is
related in some detail to the three areas noted in INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 3 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FEDERAL PROGRAM POLICIES IN PUERTO
RICO ch. 4, (1978). The issue of submerged land is also discussed in Note, Statehood and the
Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case for Puerto Rican Seabed Rights, 88 YALE L.J. 825 (1979).
Recent legislation has accorded Puerto Rico treatment similar to a State. Act of Mar. 13,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-205, 94 Stat. 84. The extension to three leagues, similar to that used in
Texas and Florida, confirms the Spanish claim Puerto Rico had made. The legislation was a
triumph for Puerto Rico, which had long sought this statutory recognition. However, Com-
monwealth partisans have argued that the United States should follow the international
Law of the Sea negotiations and recognize Puerto Rican jurisdiction over the seabed and
jurisdiction over the 200 mile economic zone.
- 29"U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 208 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
1 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT OF LABOR-WASHINGTON, EMPLOYMENT AND EARN-
INGS (1976); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. DEP'T OF LABOR-PUERTO RICo, EMPLEO, HORAS, Y
SALARIOS EN LOS INDUSTRIAS MANUFACTURERAS DE PUERTO RICO (1976); NATHAN ASSOCIATES,
THE MINIMUM WAGE ISSUE IN PUERTO RICO 64 (Report to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico)
(1973)). In 1950, the average hourly wage in Puerto Rico was 42 cents, 28/o of the Stateside
rate of $1.50.
' Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, §§ 1-19, 52 Stat. 1050 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
- 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
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mainland was not disruptive. In Puerto Rico, however, where the
prevailing wage scale in the needlework trade was about four
cents an hour and in manufacturing about half the newly-
established minimum, there were immediate repercussions.
Needlework exports, for example, declined from twenty million
dollars in 1937 to five million dollars in 1940.1 As a result, in 1940,
by a separate amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act,'
Puerto Rico was excepted from the minimum wage established for
the Stateside laborer. Instead, a speeial committee was appointed
to set wages for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. 8
The 1961 amendments to FLSAI treated the Puerto Rican and
Stateside minimum wages more closely. In the 1961 law, the same
percentage increases that were applied to Stateside minimum
wages were required for covered industries in Puerto Rico.
However, the Secretary of Labor could appoint review commit-
tees empowered to except a particular industry from the
automatic percentage increases.' Puerto Rico argued that as a
developing economy it was unable to pay the wages paid in the
United States. 31 The eastern textile industry and labor unions, on
the other hand, feared unemployment and loss of industry from
Puerto Rico's low cost competition. The final arrangement was a
compromise. The theory behind the 1961 Act was that maintain-
ing the same relative wage scales prevented Puerto Rico from
gaining competitive advantage without being unduly harmful to
the island's economy. Furthermore, the review committee pro-
cedure could act as a safety valve if automatic percentage in-
creases would result in undue hardship for certain industries.
Subsequent amendments to FLSA followed the 1961 practice of
providing for automatic increases in the prevailing wage scale in
Puerto Rico, while retaining the possibility of exceptions via the
Proposed Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (Puerto Rico): Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1531 (1966) (statement of Ramon F. Calderon) [hereinafter cited as Puerto
Rico Labor Hearings].
2 Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, ch. 432, §§ 1-41, 54 Stat. 611 (1940) (current ver-
sion in scattered sections of 7, 16, 29 U.S.C.).
29 U.S.C. 205 (1976).
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-08, 212-14, 216, 217).
29 U.S.C. § 205 (1976).
2" Reynolds, Wages and Employment in a Labor Surplus Economy, 60 AM. ECON. REv.
19 (1965). See generally L. REYNOLDS & P. GREGORY, WAGES, PRODUCTIVITY AND IN-
DUSTRIALIZATION IN PUERTO Rico (1965).
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review committee procedure.' Coverage has been extended in-
creasingly and wages are approaching parity with the Stateside
wage.m The industry committee approach, ' although officially
supported by the Popular Democratic Party, has been attacked by
labor groups in Puerto Rico and in the States as being unduly con-
servative and as a means to delay increases in the minimum
wage.m These groups urge automatic percentage increases with
no exceptions. Others, however, emphasizing Puerto Rico's dif-
ferent economic circumstances and the ability of the Com-
monwealth government to regulate wages, urge the complete
removal of Puerto Rico from the coverage of FLSA. In 1977,
Congress, under domestic union pressure, mandated the minimum
wage for all covered industries in Puerto Rico by 1981.1 The
newly-elected Puerto Rico government also supported such a
change, arguing the need for Puerto Rico to stimulate high wage
industries and to be less dependent upon low wage, labor inten-
sive industries such as textiles and apparel.
c. Tariffs and Trade
Trade has played a crucial role in the development of Puerto
Rico.' With a relatively small population and a low income base,
Puerto Rico has little opportunity in its internal markets to
develop economies of scale in production and in competition.
Trade is also a developmental imperative for an area with a small
resource base. Furthermore, active trade provides the classic
29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205, 206 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
" For recent data on wages in Puerto Rico under the 1977 amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRESS RELEASE WH-PR-1565, NEW
MINIMUM WAGE RAISES IN PUERTO Rico EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1978 (Nov. 29, 1977). Com-
pare PUERTO Rico MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, PUERTO Rico LABOR LEGISLATION (1977).
' The Secretary of Labor must accept the wage levels established by the industry com-
mittees. The Secretary is directed to publish the industry committee's recommendations in
the Federal Register and to provide for their entering into effect fifteen days after publica-
tion. 29 U.S.C. § 208(d) (1976). The wage determination must have been reached in accor-
dance with the prescribed regulations governing the operation of the industry committees.
29 C.F.R. §§ 511. 1-19 (1966). But see Bonita, Inc. v. Wirtz, F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
' See Puerto Rico Labor Hearings, supra note 226, at 1739 (statements of Val Wer-
tyheimer and Lazare Teper). For statistics on the operation of the review committee pro-
cedure, see id. at 1881-84 (Tables 1A, 1B, & 2).
1 Maldonado, Minimum Wage Crisis, San Juan Star, Aug. 24, 1965, at 21, col. 2; Priest,
A View From Here, San Juan Star, Sept. 30, 1965, at 30, col. 1.
29 U.S.C. § 208 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
The importance of Puerto Rico's trade relationship with the United States is examined
in INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 2 PUERTO RICO INDUSTRIAL
SECTOR STUDY ch. 9 (1978).
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benefits of comparative advantage (the island receiving goods that
would have a high cost of internal production in return for goods
that it can produce comparatively cheaply), in addition to serving
as a transmitter of technology and as a very useful antimonopoly
function. Not surprisingly, Puerto Rico's external sector
represents a large portion of total production. The island has been
importing about forty-five to fifty-five percent of GDP,' com-
pared, for example, to a recent figure of about eight percent for
the United States. Most of Puerto Rico's trade is with the United
States, with about eighty to ninety percent of the imports coming
from the mainland and roughly ninety-five percent of the exports
being shipped there.4 0 Section 3 of the Foraker Act of 1900, which
is continued in force by section 58 of the Puerto Rican Federal
Relations Act, places Puerto Rico within the United States com-
mon maiket, in contrast to the other territories.24 United States-
Puerto Rico trade has been almost completely unrestricted; the
only major exception is a quota limiting imports of sugar from the
island.242
In 1959, the Fernos-Murray Bill originally provided for no tariff
or quantitative restriction on any Puerto Rican manufactured
goods shipped to the United States, "other than those that could
be placed on commerce if Puerto Rico were a State of the Union
and subject to the provisions of Section 8 of Article I of the Con-
stitution of the United States [the uniformity clause]." '24 The
Department of Agriculture objected, desiring the right to impose
restrictions in the future on Puerto Rican processed goods. 44 The
uniformity clause, of course, was declared inapplicable to Puerto
Rico in the landmark Insular Cases.245
Section 2 of the Foraker Act of 1900, which also retains validity
as a result of section 58 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations
2" BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 859 (1976). See generally II Puerto
Rican Compact Hearings, supra note 147, at 254 (statement of Hubert Barton).
"o BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 861 (1976).
UI 48 U.S.C. § 738 (1976).
The key pieces of legislation regulating sugar are the Jones-Costigan Sugar Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 608-11, 613, 615-17, 620 (1976), and the Sugar Acts of: 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1100-01,
1111-15, 1117-22, 1131-37 (1976); 1948, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1100-01, 1111-22, 1131-37, 1151-60 (1976);
1962, codified in scattered sections of 7, 26 U.S.C.; and 1965 codified in scattered sections of
7, 26 U.S.C.
' H.R. 5926, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The revised bill permitted the continuation of
the sugar quota and the imposition of tariffs on goods brought to Puerto Rico and processed
there. H.R. 9234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
' See Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act Hearings on S. 2023 Before the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 124 (1959).
' Insular Cases, supra note 32.
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Act, provides that the same tariff rates be imposed on all imports
from foreign markets entering the States or Puerto Rico.246
However, following the hurricane of September 13, 1928, "the cof-
fee industry suffered losses estimated at seventy-five percent,
and one fourth of the rural population of Porto Rico was reduced
to a condition of misery . ,,."I In response, the Farm Credit Ad-
ministration organized coffee cooperatives to which it was
prepared to extend loans. However, these cooperatives were fac-
ed with low-priced Brazilian imports, which would have prevented
the rebuilding of the industry. Congress, therefore, in June 1930,
empowered the legislature of Puerto Rico to set a duty on coffee
imports entering Puerto Rico, although no such duty was to be im-
posed on imports into the States.48 Pursuant to this authorization,
the Puerto Rican legislature enacted a duty of ten cents per pound
"on all coffee imported into Puerto Rico." '249 The Collector of
Customs attempted to collect these duties on coffee imported from
the States to Puerto Rico, but the duties were declared invalid on
the basis of section 3 of the Foraker Act, which provides for duty
free transit between Puerto Rico and the United States.2' The
court, noting that the Puerto Rican resolution was passed one
month prior to the authorizing language in the Tariff Act of 1930,
stated: "The Joint Resolution was void for want of constitutional
power to adopt it, and it was not validated by a subsequent
amendment to the Organic Act which did not ratify and confirm it,
but merely authorized the enactment of such legislation." 1
Subsequent to this decision, Congress, on June 18, 1934,
declared that "the taxes and duties imposed . . . by Joint Resolu-
tion Numbered 59 ... are legalized and ratified .... ,,I The Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals suggested that Congress, by this
legislation, had indeed empowered the Puerto Rican legislature to
impose taxes and duties on coffee coming from the States to Puerto
Rico, but that the Puerto Rican Joint Resolution in referring to
"coffee imported into Puerto Rico" was using the word "imports"
-, 48 U.S.C. § 739 (1976).
" J. Res. No. 59, adopted by the Legislature of Puerto Rico, and approved by the Gover-
nor on May 5, 1930, 1 P.R. LAWS ANN. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 742, reprinted in Puerto Rico
Brokerage Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 605, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1935), affg 71 F.2d 469 (C.C.P.A.
1934), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 671 (1936).
- 19 U.S.C. § 1319 (1976).
J.9  Res. No. 59, supra note 247.
Puerto Rico Brokerage Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 469 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
'' Id. at 472.
19 U.S.C. § 1319a (1976).
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in its constitutional sense and thereby was limiting its duties to
coffee entering from foreign ports.25 Thus, present federal law re-
quires that the same tariff rates be imposed on all imports from
foreign countries entering the States or Puerto Rico with the
single exception of coffee. 5 Coffee may be imported duty free into
the United States, where very little coffee is grown,255 but a tariff,
the rate of which is determined by the Puerto Rican legislature,M
is imposed on imports into Puerto Rico, where a significant
amount of coffee is produced.2"7
On the general question of tariffs, there has been some concern
in Puerto Rico that the different economic positions of the Com-
monwealth and the United States could lead to broad tariff reduc-
tions harmful to Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's competitors -largely
underdeveloped and developing countries-are current or poten-
tial producers of the same products that now characterize Puerto
Rican production. Duty reductions proffered by the developed na-
tions and the United States will likely only bring these countries'
products, produced at markedly lower labor costs, directly into
competition with Puerto Rican goods in the American market. On
the other hand, concessions that the developed countries are seek-
ing from these areas are largely for the capital goods that
American industries are prepared to serve but which Puerto Rico
cannot, since it is a capital goods importer. Thus, the concessions
sought by developed nations such as the United States will not,
except in rare instances, benefit Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico,
I Puerto Rico Brokerage Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 605, 611 (C.C.P.A. 1935), aff'g 71
F.2d 469 (C.C.P.A. 1934), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 671 (1936).
' In 1965, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Tariff Schedules Technical Amend-
ments Act giving the Secretary of the Treasury the power to set a different rate of duty for
particleboard entering Puerto Rico. Amend. nos. 12, 6 to H.R. 7969, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
111 CONG. REC. 24,053 (1965). This was dropped in conference. H.R. REP. No. 979, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
Hawaii produces small quantities of coffee.
The Puerto Rican Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce assists in this regard. P.R.
LAWS ANN. 1979 tit. 13, § 2201. The Congressional delegation has been held valid since
Commonwealth, but the redelegation by the Puerto Rican legislature was overturned in
Pan American Standard Brands, Inc. v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 769 (U.S. Cust. Ct.
1959). The Puerto Rican legislature subsequently redelegated part of its power to the Puer-
to Rican executive in a more restricted fashion. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 2201 (1979). This
redelegation has not been tested in the courts.
I This situation is specifically mentioned in the GATT protocols. General Agreements
on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Schedule XX, pt. 1, 11654, 61 Stat. A3 (1947), T.I.A.S.
No. 1700 (effective Jan. 1, 1948). Coffee production is very costly in Puerto Rico. As a
result, the Puerto Rican legislature has passed a statute giving incentives to farmers to
convert land from coffee production to other crops. See generally N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,
1966, at 28, col. 7.
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therefore, wishes to divorce its own situation as much as possible
from that of the States, whose particular trade and tariff needs
are different.
In the Fernos-Murray Bill, the Commonwealth requested that
the President be required to exclude Puerto Rico from any trade
agreement upon request of the Commonwealth "unless he finds
that the general interest of the United States requires that Puerto
Rico be included."' Although this did not pass, Puerto Rico has
always obtained some special benefit in connection with United
States trade negotiations. After a recent round of trade negotia-
tions, which envisioned imports from the Caribbean into the
United States, Puerto Rico, along with the Virgin Islands, ob-
tained a legal amendment granting compensatory amounts where
there were "[c]oncession-related revenue losses [accruing] to the
United States possessions."' ' 9
Oil import controls highlight the special Puerto Rico economic
situation arising from trade arrangements. In 1957, the United
States instituted a voluntary oil import program, which was made
mandatory in 1959. Under this program, quotas are imposed on
the amount of crude oil and other oils that are imported into the
mainland. Because shipments between Puerto Rico and the United
States are not regulated and to prevent transshipments in viola-
tion of the program, the Presidential Proclamation places limits on
oil imported into Puerto Rico from foreign sources." ' An il-
lustrative case concerns the Phillips Petroleum Company, which
had indicated an interest in establishing a large petrochemical
complex in Puerto Rico. With the Commonwealth government's
endorsement, Phillips requested that it be permitted to import an
additional 50,000 barrels of hydrocarbon feedstock (unfinished
oils) a day into Puerto Rico. Despite considerable opposition by
other oil companies, the Secretary of Interior on May 14, 1965,
after scrutinizing the terms of the Phillips investment, granted
permission for a period of ten years from the start-up of the
plant. 2 The competitive advantage gained by Phillips was les-
H.R. 5926, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., art. IV (f), 105 CONG. REC. 4998 (1959).
H.R. 4537, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1112; S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 274-75
(1979). See also H.R. REP. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 203, reprinted in [1979] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 144.
'6 Presidential Proc. No. 3279, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959).
2 Id.
Letter from Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall to the Hon. Roberto Sanchez
Vilella and Stanley Learned, May 11, 1965, reprinted in DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR. PRESS
RELEASE No. 63476-65 (May 14, 1965).
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sened considerably as a result of the subsequent revisions of the
oil import quota regulations. Under the revisions, the Secretary
of Interior is authorized to grant allocations for imports of crude
oil "as feedstocks for facilities" if the objectives of the oil import
program are not impaired and it will "promote substantial expan-
sion of employment in Puerto Rico through industrial develop-
ment."2"
Importation rights were an important issue in the federal rela-
tionship in the 1960s and early 1970s. Following the OPEC oil
price increases in 1973, the extent and type of federal regulation
was the critical element revolving around allocations and en-
titlements. Prior to 1973, imported petroleum and petroleum pro-
ducts were substantially cheaper than domestically-produced
counterparts on the mainland. After the OPEC price increase the
situation was reversed. Foreign crude oil and petrochemical
feedstocks became much more expensive than those of the United
States, where the prices of natural gas (used in mainland
petrochemical production) and crude oil were subject to controls.
Although a system of entitlements was enacted, aimed at equaliz-
ing the price of crude oil through cost-sharing payments between
those refiners with access to the cheaper, controlled domestic oil
and those that relied more on expensive foreign petroleum,
Puerto Rico no longer had the cost advantage it once enjoyed.
Further, entitlement payments were only for crude oil; expensive
imported petrochemical feedstocks were not covered in the basic
program (although recently entitlements have been granted for
naptha, an important petrochemical input).
The question of how Puerto Rico would fit into the United
States allocation scheme for petroleum products has also been an
important question in light of the OPEC ascendance. When the ra-
tioning base period was set nationally at the 1972 levels of con-
sumption, Puerto Rico was given special treatment in that it ob-
tained, in March 1974, allocations based on its 1973 levels."5 It was
pointed out that while the United States is only forty-five percent
dependent on oil for its energy, over ninety-nine percent of Puerto
Rico's energy is petroleum based. In addition, with Puerto Rican
economic growth and industrialization proceeding so rapidly, the
island's energy consumption is increasing at a rate of twelve per-
Oil Import Reg. 1 (rev. 5), 31 Fed. Reg. 7745 (1966).
Id. § 15(c)(1).
"'See INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 3 ECONOMIC EF-
FECTS OF FEDERAL PROGRAM POLICIES RELATING TO PUERTO RICO, supra note 220, ch. IV.
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cent a year as opposed to less than five percent per year on the
mainland. These factors lead to the conclusion that an equal shar-
ing of the burdens of the oil shortage should lead to Puerto Rico
receiving proportionally less of a petroleum cutback than a typical
State with a lower economic growth rate to support and less oil
dependence.
The island also gained considerable control over its internal
allocation of petroleum products. As the regulations were initially
drafted, all Category I needs (such as "residential, commercial,
educational, and other space heating," "medical purposes,"
''emergency purposes," "transportation services," excluding
tourism, and "energy production," excluding public utilities) were
to be satisfied before any Category II needs (electric utility, in-
dustrial and manufacturing, and other uses) were met. Since about
sixty percent of Puerto Rico's middle distillates were already go-
ing to the mainland in 1972, Puerto Rico could have lost all its
vital fuels, as unfilled Category I needs continued to grow, unless
the exception were granted."
Energy legislation epitomizes the Puerto Rico economic diffi-
culty. The legislation is caught up in a broader issue and even
where special treatment is accorded to Puerto Rico, the island
benefits in relation to others. If its condition should change so that
the island's relative position changes vis-a-vis the mainland, it
may face serious economic consequences. "Fiscal autonomy" in a
situation such as this is political mythology, even if the economic
problems warrant a special exception.
2. Political Participation
The other side of the economic question is political representa-
tion. As early as 1905, commentators noted that the principle of no
taxation without representation was being violated in the ter-
ritories." Although in Puerto Rico such is not the case because
taxation is not imposed, the relationship between the tax struc-
ture, economic structure, and political participation is contradic-
tory.' As noted above, the rights to vote for executive officials or
to be represented in the Congress are not necessary consequences
See Comments of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to United States of America Federal
Energy Office (n.d.).
"' See generally W. WILLOUGHBY, TERRITORIES AND DEPENDENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
(1905).
' Puerto Rico has been alert to its anomalous status. See, e.g., Memorandum from
Government and General Research Division to the Honorable Jorge Luis Cordova-Diaz,
Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico, Study of the Concept of No Taxation Without
Representation (Dec. 2, 1969).
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of citizenship. 9 Puerto Rico is underrepresented in the Congress
and has no vote in Congress or in presidential elections. At pre-
sent, Puerto Rico is represented in the United States Congress by
a Resident Commissioner elected every four years pursuant to
Puerto Rican law. The Resident Commissioner is paid the same as
a congressman, and receives the same stationery allowance and
franking privileges. His role in Congress is determined by the
House rules, under which he may be a member of only three House
Committees, although he may introduce bills and speak on the
House floor. He may not vote, but may obtain seniority for com-
mittee posts." The Proposed Compact put forth by the Com-
monwealth partisans in 1975 would have broadened Puerto Rico's
representation by requiring representation from the island both
in the Senate and House of Representatives with "all the rights
and privileges . . .as are compatible with the Constitution of the
United States.""'
In the jockeying for position among the Commonwealth and
Statehood advocates in Puerto Rico, those supporting Statehood
have urged the presidential vote for Puerto Rico. In addition, a
joint United States-Puerto Rico Ad Hoc Committee on the
presidential vote unanimously made such a recommendation."
Commonwealth advocates did not reject this approach but simply
suggested that it was not an issue of major importance. In fact, a
general amendment extending the vote for President to all ter-
ritorial citizens would be consistent with United States citizen-
ship, even if not required under existing precedents. At any rate,
Puerto Rico has gained some political stature in the presidential
arena, as its share of the delegates for the Democratic and
Republican conventions increased significantly under revised par-
ty rules.
VII. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
A. Scope of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter
Although Congress and the Supreme Court have avoided
referring to the international issues surrounding Puerto Rico, the
,' Sanchez v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 239 (D.P.R., 1974).
20 In case of a vacancy due to death or resignation, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations
Act sets forth the procedure: the Governor may appoint another person "with the advice
and consent of the senate." 48 U.S.C. § 892 (1976). The Fernos-Murray Bill of 1959 sug-
gested that the procedure to fill the vacancy be left to Puerto Rican law. H.R. 5926, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., art. XI (c) (1959).
Proposed Compact, supra note 137, at § 10(a).
27 Report of Ad Hoc Advisory Group, supra note 137, at 160.
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executive branch has been aware of the questions.73 Article 73 of
the United Nations Charter requires colonial powers administer-
ing non-self-governing territories to report "statistical and other
information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and
educational conditions in the territories" ' and "to promote . . .
the well-being of the inhabitants . . and to develop self-
government."275 The Charter does not define self-government or
give any specific indication concerning those nations and ter-
ritories to which the article was meant to apply. Nonetheless,
seven United Nations members-Australia, Belgium, France, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States -voluntarily declared that they were administering
seventy-four non-self-governing territories and, pursuant to arti-
cle 73(e), began transmitting the required information.
In the United Nations, there have been numerous discussions
and several General Assembly resolutions concerning the extent
of the coverage of article 73. However, it has been impossible to
arrive at a consensus concerning the meaning of self-government.
Some members expressed the concern that by 1952 reports were
no longer being submitted on fifteen of the seventy-four ter-
ritories on the original list, since these territories had, the ad-
ministering nations said, achieved the "full measure" of self-
government required by the Charter. The concern that ad-
ministering nations would ignore requirements of article 73 by
self-serving statements as to the self-governing status of their ter-
ritories prompted the General Assembly to establish in 1949 (over
the objections of the administering nations) an Ad Hoc Committee
on Information" which, in 1952, gave rise to a series of recommen-
dations and a list of factors to be considered in connection with
the requirement of self-government.
The factors to be considered were those indicative of the attain-
ment of independence, those indicative of the attainment of other
systems of self-government (now no longer relevant), and those
showing free association of a territory with all or any part of its
metropole or other country. The third category included (a)
general factors (political advancement, opinion of the population,
See generally A. LEIBOWITZ, COLONIAL EMANCIPATION IN THE PACIFIC AND THE CARIB-
BEAN (1976); E. SAIDY, THE UNITED AND DEPENDENT PEOPLES (1956); D. WAINHOUSE, REM-
NANTS OF EMPIRE (1964). M. REISMAN, supra note 194, focuses on Puerto Rico.
M4 U.N. CHARTER art. 73(e). See note 90 supra.
"5 Id. art. 73(d).
" G.A. Res. 66 (I) (Dec. 14, 1946), reprinted in [1946-19471 U.N.Y.B. 208-11.
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geographic considerations, ethnic and cultural considerations), (b)
the legal or constitutional nature of the association, (c) considera-
tions with respect to the status of the territory (legislative
representation, citizenship of the territory's inhabitants, and
eligibility of officials from the territory to enter public offices of
the central authority), and (d) internal constitutional conditions
(universal suffrage; free, periodic elections characterized by an
absence of undue influence; scope of territorial legislative rights
of the inhabitants; and method of choosing local officials)." The
weight accorded the inclusion or omission of any one of these was
not stated. The United States suggested that Puerto Rico fell into
category three as a result of its status as a Commonwealth and,
therefore, that the United States would cease to transmit further
information under article 73(e).
B. United Nations Discussion
The competence of the General Assembly to judge the actions
of developed countries divided the United Nations membership.
The United States, other administering States, and a very small
group of non-administering nations asserted that only the ad-
ministering nations were competent to determine when a non-self-
governing territory had acquired the "full measure of self-
government." The basic argument was that if they were compe-
tent to determine in the first instance which territories should be
placed on the list as non-self-governing, they were also competent
to determine when that condition had ceased."' Furthermore,
some members believed that the administering state might stop
sending the reports before the "full measure of self-government"
was reached because article 73(e) spoke only of information
relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the ter-
ritories. Since the achievement of self-government usually came
about in steps, there might come a time when a territory con-
trolled its own economic, social, and educational institutions, even
if it had not attained full self-government politically."'
"' G.A. Res. 648 (VII) (Annex), 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20A) 34, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952).
" Upon joining the United Nations in 1955, Portugal and Spain declared their territories
an integral part of the State and, therefore, not subject to the reporting requirement. The
United Nations, on its own authority, put both nations' territories on the list requiring
reports, and acted similarly in the case of Southern Rhodesia in 1962.
m Compare the 1952 General Assembly resolution which stated: "[Flor a Territory to be
deemed self-governing in economic, social, or educational affairs, it is essential that its peo-
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The non-administering members, to the contrary, argued that
the administering States had entered into a bilateral obligation
from which they could not free themselves unilaterally. It was
asserted that transmissions could not cease until conditions set by
the article had been satisfied and, furthermore, that the General
Assembly was competent to examine each case to determine
whether the "full measure of self-government" had been attained
by the territory. As to the degree of self-government required,
many States considered it erroneous to look to article 73(e) in
isolation, which spoke of economic, social, and educational issues
and not of "political" ones. Such States believed that all of article
73 must be considered, in addition to other documents such as the
Declaration of Human Rights. In no case, it was argued, should
the reports cease when the territory had not yet acquired political
as well as economic, social, and educational self-government;
sovereignty was indivisible. It was argued further that there
could be no true self-government without independence, and that
any association was suspect. Still others insisted that association
with the administering State based upon the territory's self-
government was impossible unless it had been preceded by in-
dependence.2 s0
The United States government memorandum advising
Secretary-General Trygve Lie of the cessation of information
under article 73(e) emphasized the Commonwealth status and the
Constitution of Puerto Rico, as indicated in the following passage:
In 1948 the people of Puerto Rico had held a national election in
which was debated the issue of what kind of government they
should have. Alternatives supported by opposing political par-
ties had been that Puerto Rico should become a state in the
Federal Union of the United States, an independent State, or a
pie shall have attained a full measure of self-government." G.A. Res. 648 (VII) (4), 7 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 20A) 34, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952). This was reaffirmed in the 1953 recom-
mendations.
The resolution recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee on Factors stated:
the manner in which Territories referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter can
become fully self-governing is primarily through the attainment of independence,
although it is recognized that self-government can also be achieved by association
with another State or group of States if this is done freely and on the basis of ab-
solute equality.
G.A. Res. 742 (VIII) (6), 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 22, U.N. Doe. A/2630 (1953). The posi-
tion of the Puerto Rico Bar Association is that a severance must take place prior to any
choice for the Association. THE PUERTO Rico BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, REPORT ON THE ESSENTIAL PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO THE DECOLONIZATION
OF PUERTO RICO (1977).
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commonwealth associated with the United States. By an over-
whelming vote, the people of Puerto Rico had chosen the latter
solution.
Subsequently, the Resident Commissioner, Mr. Fernos-Isern,
had caused legislation to be introduced in the United States
Congress, the result of which had been the adoption by the Con-
gress of Public Law 600, authorizing the people of Puerto Rico
to draft and adopt their own constitution. A constitutional con-
vention had then been convened in Puerto Rico and in due
course the new Constitution had been ratified by the Congress
of the United States and by the Puerto Rican people, again by
an overwhelming majority.
A fundamental feature of the new Constitution was that it
was in the nature of a compact between the United States Con-
gress and the Puerto Rican people. The United States district
court for Puerto Rico, which was a Federal court, had ruled that
neither the Congress of the United States nor the people of
Puerto Rico could unilaterally amend Public Law 600 or the
Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act without the consent and ap-
proval of the other party. That decision had been upheld in the
United States circuit court of appeals.28 '
The debate on the issue was quite extensive. In view of the fact
that the criteria for a self-governing territory were unclear, by
emphasizing certain factors in the association, the delegates were
able to support a variety of conclusions. Most delegates who
believed that Puerto Rico was self-governing emphasized the
referendum, the free choice given Puerto Rico to enter into the
association, 82 and the mutuality principle of the compact.'
Others-the Commonwealth and metropole countries-refused to
review the judgment of the United States but urged that the
General Assembly "note" the decision of the United States no
longer to report under article 73(e) with respect to Puerto Rico.' u
' 8 U.N. GAOR, C. 4 (348th mtg.) 215, U.N. Doc. A/C. 4/SR. 348 (1953).
Remarks of the Cuban delegate, 8 U.N. GAOR, C. 4 (349th mtg.) 219, U.N. Doc. A/C.
4/SR. 349 (1953); remarks of the Panamanian delegate, id. at 241; remarks of the Canadian
delegate, id. at 242; remarks of the Brazilian delegate, id at 245-47; remarks of the Peru-
vian delegate, id. at 248; remarks of the Iranian delegate, id. at 249; remarks of the Costa
Rican delegate, id. at 251; remarks of the Haitian delegate, id at 254; remarks of the Bolivian
delegate, id., at 259; remarks of the Venezuelan delegation, id. at 261; remarks of the
Chinese delegates, id. at 261; remarks of the Israeli delegates, id at 252.
' Remarks of the Panamanian delegate, id. at 241; remarks of the Brazilian delegate, id.
at 245-47; remarks of the delegate from Ecuador, id. at 227-31.
' Remarks of the Belgian delegate, id. at 254; remarks of the delegate from the
Netherlands, id. at 259; remarks of the New Zealand delegate, id. at 260; remarks of the
delegate from the United Kingdom, id. at 261.
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Some of these delegates also limited their decision to the
economic, social, and educational criteria mentioned in article
73(e), and on these criteria they concurred in the United States
position.2 5
The delegates voting in favor of continued reporting stressed
the limited choice afforded in the referendum on Public Law 600
and the powers retained by the United States over Puerto Rican
affairs. Many delegations were concerned by the absence of the
possibility of independence as an alternative in the referendum
submitted to the Puerto Rican people in 1950.1 This omission was
emphasized when the right of secession was brought forward by
the Committee on Factors. 7 Other delegates believed that the
United States control over foreign affairs and defense,' the
absence of a compact,9 the economic dependence of Puerto Rico,'
and the lack of a vote by the Resident Commissioner in Congress,
and the fact that Congress could pass laws substantially affecting
Puerto Rico 1 meant that Puerto Rico was non-self-governing."
The vote taken by roll call draft Resolution VIII 3 was twenty-
six in favor of the United States position, sixteen against, and
eighteen abstentions.' The United States considered the issue
settled with that vote. However, the question of Puerto Rico's
status has persisted at the United Nations. Since 1972, the Com-
mittee on Decolonization, with the support of independence par-
' Remarks of the Canadian delegate, id. at 242; remarks of the Costa Rican delegate, id.
at 259; remarks of the Swedish delegate, id. at 259.
U' Remarks of the Yugoslavian delegate, id. at 236-37; remarks of the Egyptian delegate,
id. at 258; remarks of the Lebanese delegate, id. at 261; remarks of the Indonesian delegate,
id. at 240.
Remarks of the Polish delegate, id. at 242; compare the remarks of the Canadian
delegate, id. at 242.
' Remarks of the delegate of the Ukraine, id. at 233-34; remarks of the Indian delegate,
id. at 235-36; remarks of the Burmese delegate; id. at 237; remarks of the Honduran
delegate, id. at 239; remarks of the Argentine delegate, id. at 251.
Remarks of the Yugoslavian delegate, id. at 236-37; remarks of the Czechoslovakian
delegate, id. at 237-38; remarks of the Honduran delegate, id. at 239; remarks of the Indone-
sian delegate, id. at 240; remarks of the Iraqi delegate, id. at 257.
"' Remarks of the Egyptian delegate, id. at 258.
21 Remarks of the Mexican delegate, id. at 222-24; remarks of the delegate of the
Ukraine, id. at 233-34; remarks of the Indian delegate, id. at 253; remarks of the Indonesian
delegate, id. at 240.
It is interesting to note that only the Indonesian and Czechoslovakian delegates
analyzed extensively the relationship in terms of the factors that had just been approved
by the Fourth Committee. Id. at 237-38, 240.
2 This later became the General Assembly's resolution 748 (VIII). G.A. Res. 748 (VIII), 8
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 25, U.N*. Doc. A/2630 (1953).
8 U.N. GAOR (459th plen. mtg.) 320, U.N. Doc. AJPV. 459 (1953).
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tisans in Puerto Rico, has discussed the Puerto Rican situation.
The United States refused to recognize the United Nations action
following the 1952 action. Nonetheless, the Carter Administration
was receptive to United Nations supervision of United States ter-
ritorial jurisdiction generally. Although the official United States
position is that Puerto Rico is no longer under United Nations
purview, the United States permitted United Nations teams to
visit United States territories for the first time (Virgin Islands
and Guam) and supported a new referendum on Puerto Rico's
status in 1981. President Carter pledged: "Should the Govern-
ment of Puerto Rico decide to hold a referendum, I will support,
and urge the Congress to support, whatever decision the people of
Puerto Rico reach." 295
In 1978, a full debate before the United Nations Committee on
Decolonization on the Puerto Rican "question" culminated with
the suggestion that only independence or Commonwealth- not
Statehood-were possible status choices, and that selection was
to be made only after severance of all ties with the United States.
The position was contrary to previous United Nations positions
where integration was an acceptable alternative and prior
severance was not required. The resolution, strongly supported
by Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Communist regimes, passed
the Committee with ten aye votes and twelve abstentions but was
not sent to the General Assembly. Recent action of the United Na-
tions indicates that the case of Puerto Rico will continue to be the
subject of Decolonization Committee and General Assembly
discussion.2
Although the United States Congress has appeared to be un-
concerned with United Nations comment, it recently passed a
resolution "reaffirming the commitment of Congress to the right
of the people of Puerto Rico to determine their own political
future." 7 The resolution constitutes the strongest statement to
date of Congressional willingness to accept Statehood or in-
dependence for Puerto Rico. Senator Moynihan noted that the
resolution "implies a duty on the part of Congress to negotiate in
good faith with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to attempt to
accommodate the wishes of the people of Puerto Rico." 8
"' Proclamation of President Carter, July 25, 1978 PuB PAPERS 1336, in statement by
Amb. Andrew Young, U.N. PRESS RELEASE USUN-78 (Aug. 28, 1978).
2" See, e.g., Special Comm. Dec. of 12 Sept. 1978, adopted at the ll60th meeting on 15-16
Aug. 1979.
S. Con. Res. 35, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S11,371 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1979).
2" Id. at S11,373.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The concept of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the United
States political system was initiated at a time when there was
broad political consensus in Puerto Rico as to the desirability of
Commonwealth and strong support within the United States for
the innovative aspect of this new form of government. Since then,
the consensus in Puerto Rico has broken. It appeared, until
recently, that a new consensus in Puerto Rico was emerging in
support of Statehood. The Congress, President Carter, and Presi-
dent Reagan and Vice President Bush in their primary campaigns
supported the possibility. And, as indicated above, Congress was
not unwilling to support Puerto Rican desires. However, the
November 1980 elections reversed-or at least slowed-this
direction. Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo, a strong supporter of
Statehood, was reelected, but just barely, and the Commonwealth
Party captured one house of the legislature. As a result, Governor
Romero Barcelo has announced a delay of the 1981 planned status
referendum. The divided political posture has prevented not only
Statehood in Puerto Rico, but also has stymied growth and direc-
tion for the Commonwealth concept as well.
The federal government appears equally uncertain as to how
much support should be given to the Commonwealth concept. The
negotiation of the covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Marianas means that the novelty is no longer present.
The United States, faced with other "Commonwealths" arising out
of the Trust Territory negotiations, has been cautious in allowing
exceptions to federal law based on this status, although it has per-
mitted specific negotiated exceptions. The Supreme Court has
taken a stronger role in recent years. In dicta, it has supported
Commonwealth as a legally recognized status of potentially great
importance, but its holdings have treated Commonwealth as no
different from a territory. Lower courts in the States have been
equally chary in defining the Commonwealth concept. On the
other hand, the judiciary in Puerto Rico, both federal and local,
strongly supported the concept, most recently by extending the
environmental protection laws to prevent the transfer of Haitian
refugees to Puerto Rico.
As economic issues have become more important, Puerto Rico
has tended to be treated, frequently at it own request, more like a
State by the Congress and the executive branch. Probably, both
Statehood and Commonwealth concepts will depend for their
economic participation and regulatory exemption on some finan-
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cial participation or lessening of the tax exemption status. In large
measure, the direction of the Commonwealth will depend upon the
political consensus within Puerto Rico and whether cultural
preservation is linked to non-Statehood questions alone. It may
also depend on whether the cultural issue becomes less significant
than the economic pressures on Puerto Rico. Regardless of which
course of government the Puerto Rican people choose in the
future, legal, political, and cultural change appears inevitable.

